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ABSTRACT 
 
 
NEAL PARKER.  Pricing strategies for online multiplayer games. 
(Under the direction of DR. MOUTAZ KHOUJA) 
 
 
This dissertation examines the different pricing strategies available to online 
multiplayer game publishers.  We develop mathematical models of the pricing decision 
that the publisher engages in and conduct a numerical experiment to identify critical 
parameters for the pricing decision.  We also develop an agent based simulation to further 
examine the influence of these parameters on the dynamics between the publisher and 
consumers and make recommendations about the conditions under which certain pricing 
strategies are superior to others. 
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CHAPTER 1: ONLINE GAMES AND GAMING 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
It is a long way from the first futile efforts of Ralph Baer in 1949, the start of 
Atari in 1972, the 8-bit Nintendo of 1986, and the first massively multiplayer online 
game called Meridian 59 in 1996 all the way up to the technical and financial juggernauts 
of the console and computer games of contemporary times.  What’s more, the world of 
video games is still evolving (Herman, Horwitz, Kent, & Miller, 2002).  In the early 
nineties, industry analysts and scholars were uncertain as to the future of games and game 
companies (Shapiro E. , 1991); however, video games, specifically online multiplayer 
games, have seen exponential growth over the past decade.  In 2001, sales of hardware 
and software for game systems rose 43 percent to $9.4 billion exceeding the revenues of 
Hollywood’s box office receipts (Faber, Lee, & Nan, 2004) and such growth has been 
across the globe (Scanlon, 2007).  Activision Blizzard (NASDAQ GS: ATVI), publisher 
of the largest online game, earned revenues of $3.026 billion in 2008 year, a 120 million 
dollar increase from  2007.  Within some market segments, online games are among the 
most popular forms of entertainment (MacInnes & Hu, 2007;  Huhh, 2008), perhaps as a 
result of the large increase in broadband and high speed Internet connections (Ulmer, 
2004; Jones & Fox, 2009). 
Individuals choose to spend both time and money on games for a variety of 
reasons and the research concerning this adoption and use behavior is still ongoing (Choi 
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& Kim, 2004; Griffiths, Davies, & Chappell, 2004; Yee, 2006).  Rather than view gaming 
as a subset of “play,” it may be possible to treat game enjoyment as an inherent separate 
activity that is its own social artifact (Malaby, 2007).  Among the factors impacting 
online game enjoyment are the story (or plot), the graphics, the length (as an extension of 
the natural limits of the plot), and the game’s level or type of control or interface (Wu, Li, 
& Rao, 2008).  Players take their gaming seriously.  The economics of online multiplayer 
games are elaborate.  The exchange rate between game currencies and national currencies 
like the US Dollar or the Euro are closely monitored.  The game currency in EverQuest 
makes this virtual environment the 77
th
 wealthiest nation in the world (Lindstrom, 2004) 
in terms of currency valuation. 
Given the fragmented nature of the online game industry, the massive revenue 
potential that the industry has represented to date, and the difficulties that some entities 
involved in providing games to consumers, it behooves us to consider various pricing 
strategies for the different types of games.  The following sections provide a motivation 
for this research effort and provide a review of literature pertinent to the topic at hand.  A 
thorough game classification is followed by a discussion about the attributes or 
characteristics of games.  A description of the video game industry structure precedes a 
review of the economic factors of game pricing. 
1.2 Motivation 
This research effort is designed to provide a theoretical framework for the pricing 
of online multiplayer video games.  Given that online games are a relatively new 
phenomenon and that there is only a limited number of relevant studies on their pricing, 
development of good pricing models will enable better and faster development of the 
3 
field, enable greater profits for developers and publishers, promote diffusion of workable 
pricing models throughout the industry, and lead to better decision making by the 
involved parties.  The goal of this research effort is to provide effective pricing for a 
relatively new and emerging industry.   
As discussed in later sections, pricing is contingent on a number of different 
factors, many of which are inter-related.  Before presenting a model of online multi-
player game pricing strategies, it is necessary to answer concerns regarding the 
classification of online games.  Specifically, a logical classification of game types must 
be determined.  The aim of such is to enable models to be generalizable within each class, 
and to allow conclusions about pricing to be drawn between classes.  Such models would 
be more useful than those efforts which treat all digital experience goods as a single type 
of purchase.   
1.3 Game Classification 
An online gamer faces a bewildering array of game types, variations, play styles, 
themes, and options.  No two games are exactly alike, and some, despite sharing code in 
the form of game or graphics engines, are radically different.  Classifications can be made 
along a variety of factors (Chambers, Feng, Sahu, & Saha, 2005).  While virtual worlds 
have been examined to attempt to fashion a typology (Messenger, Stroulia, & Lyons, 
2008), such efforts have been anecdotal in nature and have not been put to any form of 
test.  Throughout the next section, we illustrate critical differences between types of 
games.  These differences make a classification scheme possible as shown in Figure 1.1. 
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1.3.1 Console vs. PC 
Games have historically been grouped into two super categories: those games 
designed for consoles, and those games designed for PC use.  When examining 
competition within the industry it may also be advisable to include handheld game 
systems as a separate category (Williams, 2002).  Different consoles have different 
hardware and subsequent generations of games may or may not be backwards 
compatible, depending on the cost of designing backwards compatibility into both the 
hardware and the game itself.  PC based games make no mention of backwards 
compatibility.  With the PC’s ability to load multiple operating systems or alternatively 
load a game program as an application for an earlier operating system, backwards 
compatibility is typically assumed as standard.  Specialized tools (emulators) may be 
used for programs from the late 1980’s and early 1990’s enabling said programs to load 
on a modern machine. 
Since a game must be modified and then compiled to run on each console type 
independently, and there may be substantial differences between console and PC 
versions, the hardware itself dictates this first method of discriminating game 
classifications.  While games are frequently released onto multiple platforms, the 
distinctions between the requirements of each are so great that it behooves us to consider 
them as being fundamentally different.   Also, gamers are typically reluctant to invest in 
new technology on a regular basis (Achterbosch, Pierce, & Simmons, 2008).  Finally, 
while updates or patches are now possible on some console systems, most PC versions 
have multiple patches released while this seldom happens for console games (Williams, 
2002). 
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1.3.2 Single Player vs. Multiplayer vs. Massive Multiplayer 
Both console and PC games frequently contain the ability for multiple players to 
challenge each other in one way or another.  Single player games are also called “Stand 
Alone” games (Griffiths, Davies, & Chappell, 2003).  Multiplayer play may occur on a 
single machine, on multiple machines on a single network, or on multiple machines on 
multiple networks.  There are different requirements for both hardware and software for 
single player as opposed to multiplayer games.  Further, these requirements change 
depending on the method (i.e. single machine vs. single network vs. multiple networks) 
that is selected for multiplayer play.  Games frequently have different load processes for 
different modes of play as the requirements are so different.  Additionally, the use of 
multiplayer play via multiple networks typically requires game servers which act in such 
a manner as to connect players or even as far as to actually host the game and make all 
executions for play on the server side.  Many technical obstacles must be overcome to 
provide a Massively Multiplayer Online Gaming experience (Waldo, 2008).  Players 
report significantly higher levels of enjoyment when competing against human characters 
or human controlled objects as opposed to computer controlled opponents further 
supporting the justification of a single versus multiplayer categorization (Weibel, 
Wissmath, Habegger, Steiner, & Groner, 2008).  With the first game to support large 
numbers of simultaneous users forming a relatively large fanbase (several thousand), the 
term Massive-Multiplayer became accepted (Achterbosch, Pierce, & Simmons, 2008). 
Not all multiplayer games can be considered massively-multiplayer.  While 
America’s Army is predominantly a multiplayer game, since it is limited to between two 
and sixteen players within a single instance of the game, and not the thousands (or tens of 
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thousands) common to typical massive multiplyer online (MMO) games, it is simply a 
multiplayer game (Nieborg, 2004).  MMO games typically have a large enough collection 
of simultaneous players for the community to form groups.  These groups may be official 
or otherwise, but persistent organizations (guilds, clans, corporations, etc.) are formed to 
carry out a collective goal (Ducheneault, Yee, Nickell, & Moore, 2007).   
1.3.3 Delivery Method 
Games may be installed on a local machine by the gamer, or may be accessed via 
a web interface.  In the former case, these games may have been purchased at a retailer or 
downloaded (legally or otherwise).  This latter method is typically only a concern for a 
PC based game.  While numerous delivery methods for games exist, one of the most 
universally popular has been Browser-based games.  Such games may be written in Flash 
or Javascript and may be loaded or accessed by any modern web browser.  Browser based 
games such as Travian and its clones have a high level of appeal due to (like several other 
types of online games) the ability to socialize with others, compete against others or other 
groups, low cost (in terms of time) to get started playing, and the ability to escape 
pressures or receive social support from other players (Klimmt, Schmid, & Orthmann, 
2009).  Social networking sites such as Facebook have been studied as a delivery method 
for online games or other network based applications (Nazir, Raza, & Chuah, 2008).  
This delivery method is somewhat unique among browser based games as it makes use of 
the powerful effects of network externalities discussed in later sections. 
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1.3.4 Persistent vs. Nonpersistent States of Play 
Both PC and console games, regardless of delivery method, can have either a 
persistent or a non-persistent state of play.  In a persistent play state, the servers have 
some type of life cycle and player attributes and activities are remembered by the server 
and can change irrespective of whether or not the player is actually active within the 
game environment.  In MMO games, a server (and thereby the accounts on said server) is 
generally persistent over time (Caltagirone, Keys, Schlief, & Willshire, 2002).  Making a 
game persistent can be difficult as game developers must ensure that the persistent data is 
consistent (a unique object may exist in one and only one place); that the game solution 
(as a service) is efficient in that it minimizes the overhead consumed by the persistence 
features; and finally that the solution is scalable across thousands of new users being 
added and increased levels of activity (Zhang, Kemme, & Denault, 2008).  In persistent 
play as players spend more time, utility increases as a function of time in the game. 
1.3.5 Genre & Type of Play 
The game’s genre and its play type are inextricably linked.  Game review 
websites and magazines frequently use these terms interchangeably leading to great 
confusion.  Indeed, it has been observed that with the gamers and the game publishers 
and developers, the word “genre” is usually referring to the type of user experience 
delivered (Ye Z. , 2004) and may focus on visual style and conventions followed by 
interface metaphor, pace, and control scheme as shown in Table 1.  Genre has been used 
to describe play type in the academic literature as well (Achterbosch, Pierce, & Simmons, 
2008).  It has also been observed that the concept of play type as shown in Table 2 and 
genre must be explicitly defined as there is no consensus about even a relatively simple 
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concept as a FPS (First Person Shooter) game (Nieborg, 2004).  Within the industry, RPG 
(Role Playing Games) and their massively multiplayer online varieties (MMORPGs) are 
occasionally described as being a separate genre further complicating matters. 
 
Table 1.1 – Common genres 
Genre Examples  
Action Dead Space  
Adventure World of Warcraft  
Fighting Mortal Kombat  
Simulation SimCity, Need for Speed  
Puzzle Break Out  
Sports Virtual Pool  
Music/Dance Guitar Hero  
 
 
Play type may be one of several different types of game mechanics or may be a 
combination of several.  That said, all data-driven games share a common set of 
architectural conventions (White, Demers, Koch, Gehrke, & Rajagopalan, 2007).   
 
Table 1.2 – Types of game play 
Play Type Examples  
Real Time Strategy (RTS) Travian  
Turn Based Strategy (TBS) Civ4  
First Person Shooter/Sneaker (FPS) America’s Army  
Role Playing Game (RPG) World of Warcraft  
Social Game Farmville  
Flight (including Space Flight) EvE Online  
Exercise/Fitness Wii Fit  
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Figure 1.1: Game classification scheme 
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1.4 Pricing of Online Games 
Online games are digital experience goods.  Traditional experience goods such as 
a vacation or viewing a movie are competitors for online games.  Online games purchases 
are generally considered to be entertainment expenditure within a household.  This 
expenditure of a gamer on a particular game  is usually dependent on the number of 
players in the game, the level of development investment in creating the game, and the 
quality of service in providing access to the game. 
1.4.1 Industry Structure 
The online game industry is constituted of a collection of members, each 
providing a different service that, when combined, eventually results in the game being 
delivered to the consumer.  This service supply chain is complex and dynamic with 
members continuously entering and exiting their market space.  A generally accepted 
model is that game developers produce the code upon which the game engine operates 
while publishers (just as in other industries) provide marketing and distribution solutions 
to get the game to consumers and set the final retail price.  However, several other 
entities such as hosting providers or application service providers must get involved when 
a game is an online multiplayer game. 
1.4.2 Experience Goods 
Games (and other forms of Digital Interactive Entertainment) are an experience 
good and as such the value of a game can only be determined post hoc by the consumer 
(Choi & Kim, 2004).  More so, games have been described as a designed experience 
where players’ understanding and identity are developed through cycles of performance 
within the virtual environment (Squire, 2006).  MMO games generally fit the four 
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characteristics of a service as they are: intangible in that a player may purchase the right 
to play the game but not any form of ownership; inseparable as a player cannot enjoy a 
MMO game without consuming it (experiencing it); variable in that there is a constantly 
changing dynamic between players, the developers, and the virtual world; and perishable 
in the case of subscription-based models in that the “eligible game time” ends after some 
agreed-upon period regardless of whether or not the account has been accessed 
(Zackariasson & Wilson, 2004).  With respect to dynamic pricing of experience goods in 
general, research has shown that in a mass market, prices decline as time passes; 
however, in a niche market, prices start low and move upwards with respect to time 
(Bergemann & Valimaki, 2006).  Alternatively, it may be in the interest for the provider 
to initially offer a high value product and then slowly (or perhaps suddenly) switch to 
offering low value products in a (likely) successful effort to exploit a good reputation for 
quality (Gale & Rosenthal, 1994).  For at least some experience goods, research efforts 
indicate that mixed pricing methods may result in greater values for profit maximization 
(Bhattacharjee, Gopal, Lertwachara, & Marsden, 2003).   
Pricing experience goods properly can be difficult for many corporations.  
However, environments where individuals congregate have traditionally been recognized 
by marketers as being an effective place for advertising.  Virtual environments are 
frequently highly interactive, collaborative, and increasingly commercial.  Within the 
virtual environment SecondLife, companies such as Adidas, BMW, IBM, Reuters, and 
Sears among others maintain some form of virtual presence; further, organizations such 
as NASA and Harvard Law also maintain a virtual presence (Barnes, 2007).  Software 
development can be a risky business proposition as many projects fail to be completed or 
12 
are otherwise deemed unviable, thus developers and publishers have traditionally 
followed “tried and trusted approaches” which have some history of success (Charles, et 
al., 2005).  Commercial success is not guaranteed; however, typically a sequel to a 
popular game or an expansion to an already successful game does mitigate some of the 
risk of the investment. 
Producers of experience goods may follow a monopolistic pricing policy.  While 
the monopoly may be weak as it is derived from product differentiation, and other firms 
may be able to somewhat influence the pricing decision (Shapiro C. , 1983), the firm can 
be seen to act as a monopolist.  Also, a firm may need to build a reputation in order to 
price higher than it otherwise could, or it may be able to “milk” its already established 
reputation; both of which scenarios render network effects more critical.  With 
monopolistic pricing, producers of experience goods will automatically set the price high 
and will maintain high quality (Liebeskind & Rumelt, 1989).  This tendency towards 
quality originates from the fact that, as games are discretionary entertainment 
expenditures, an individual does not need to purchase one.  A consumer will purchase a 
game that they consider to be a good value.  That said, as firms decrease in size relative 
to the size of the total market for experience goods, the equilibrium product quality 
increases as the market moves towards full information equilibrium (Riordan, 1986) 
meaning that customers tend to be better informed about the quality of a company’s 
offerings under these conditions.  With imperfectly informed consumers, there is a risk of 
market failure partially induced by the moral hazard arising from the observation that 
sales volume (at least initially) is independent of product quality (von Ungern-Sternberg 
& von Weizacker, 1985).  Typically a dishonest approach is discovered by the market 
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and is not a long term issue, particularly in the area of subscription based revenue 
generation as network effects work quickly to spread information about inadequate 
products throughout the market.  Each game provider is a monopolist who charges a price 
based on several factors. 
1.4.3 Factors of Pricing 
Many attributes contribute to the value and correspondingly to the price of an 
online multiplayer game; however, we choose to focus our attention on community size, 
development investment, and quality of service.  The first ensures that the game is indeed 
multiplayer, the second permits sufficient depth to the game, and the latter allows the 
game to be both “playable” and “online.” 
1.4.3.1 Player Base & Community Size 
While there is a considerable amount of literature that examines services and 
experience goods with respect to pricing, multiplayer games are a particularly special 
case and one which has been neglected to date in the literature.  Network externalities 
play a considerable role in the demand of MMO games.  Without a large player base, a 
game feels “empty.”  Interestingly, both positive and negative network externalities exist.  
Positive network externalities exist based on the quality and quantity of opponents 
whereas negative network externalities typically stem from technical issues and 
reputation problems (Meagher & Teo, 2005).  Because MMO games frequently have a 
large following and a large community, negative feedback such as complaints and 
criticisms can diffuse as fast as positive feedback.  In both cases network externalities 
make the total effect much larger than would normally be the case in a different business 
environment.  Generally, it is difficult to overcome the many obstacles that growth in 
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popularity brings, and many companies fail (Irwin, 2008).  One measure of network 
externalities is the presence of fan sites.  These sites are useful for user research as they 
influence the evolution of the game’s community (Johnson & Toiskallio, 2005).  Some 
fan sites have developer or publisher support and as such are “official” despite being 
managed by third parties.  Further evidence of network externalities are growth in 
publications by or about the digital entertainment industry (Ye & Xu, 2003).  With large 
social networking sites opening their systems to developers, applications are able to 
spread in a “viral” manner and may experience exponential growth (Nazir, Raza, & 
Chuah, 2008) which in turn leads to even higher traffic on the social networking site.  
Other network externality drivers are professional reviews.  The effects of critical 
reviews are frequently difficult to accurately measure and the relationships derived may 
be spurious (Reinstein & Snyder, 2005), however at least in the case of some experience 
goods such as movies, a large positive effect on revenue exists when positive reviews 
come from a professional possibly due to the reviewer’s access to a broader network than 
is normally the case. 
Games have a difficult time surviving unless new players are regularly introduced 
into the environment (Steinkuehler, 2006) to mitigate the attrition rate of established 
players; however, this entry of new players may lead to conflict with established players 
and to negative implications for the game environment as new players are typically not 
capable of sustained competition with more experienced players.  To complicate matters, 
certain games have steeper learning curves than others for even basic tasks and thereby 
suffer usability issues which can be overwhelming to new users and cause a lack of new 
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player retention (Cornett, 2004).  Sufficient expenditures in certain areas of development 
investment can mitigate these concerns.   
1.4.3.2 Development Investment 
On the supply side, MMO game providers have to concern themselves with the 
game design and delivery.  Few companies have both as a core competency (Shaikh, 
Sahu, Rosu, Shea, & Saha, 2004).  Game architecture, playability and game 
inconsistencies, and fairness are concerns for game providers (Brun, Safaei, & Boustead, 
2006) and correction of such issues detracts for a provider’s bottom line.  Game 
production is a complicated business in an extremely dynamic environment involving 
numerous entities striving to deliver value to the end users (Johns, 2006).  Of particular 
import to those who study games and gaming is the observation that the industry is 
cyclical but operates almost completely independent of the larger economy’s cycles with 
substantial first mover advantages being present (Crandall & Sidak, 2006). 
MMO games are experience goods in that a player must interact with the product 
in some definite way over some period of time in order to gather information about the 
actual product, its more intricate features, its quality, and its value with respect to price.  
Players typically concern themselves with features such as quality of graphics, 
elaborateness of game mechanisms such as combat or economics engines, as well as with 
the smoothness or completeness of the gaming experience.  All of these items are a direct 
function of the amount invested during the development phase.  While some aspects can 
be determined by the customer via the search for a particular product (i.e. a new online 
game) such as a partial feature list, until the player is actively involved in the game for 
some time, final judgment as to whether or not it will be played over a longer time frame 
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must be postponed.  This is because the seller of the experience good has (due to the 
nature of the product) bundled most of the information about the product within the 
product itself (Shapiro C. , 1983).  While it has been assumed in most economic literature 
that customers can immediately tell the quality of the experience good upon initial 
consumption, we are of the opinion that due to the complexity of the features of MMO 
games, the fact that players who are new to a MMO game are not (typically) given access 
to upper-level resources or benefits that more advanced players have, and the size and 
scope of the virtual worlds, that the customer forms an initial opinion which evolves as 
they interact with the game.  Generally, the game contains mechanisms or documentation 
where customers are aware of the existence of items which they have not yet earned 
access to.  Players are able to improve their in-game persona or existence with the 
intention of being able to use or earn these better items.  With increased investment in the 
form of game development, the customer will take a longer period of time to form a final 
opinion about continued play of the game.  Sufficient expenditures in terms of publishing 
or promoting costs for the game will ensure that players have a sufficient amount of 
information to make a decision about the correct value of the game. 
1.4.3.3 Quality of Service 
The Quality of Service and the quality of the actual game are two different 
factors.  The former is a function of the development investment.  The latter is a function 
of the amount expended monthly to provide adequate bandwidth, customer service, and 
other such expenses.  Online gamers are particularly sensitive to Quality of Service (QoS) 
issues (Zander & Armitage, 2004).  As an experience good, players (new and continuing 
players) make the decision to purchase access to an MMO (or other experience good of 
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similar characteristics) as a result of an internal calculation based on pre-choice 
expectations; information sources such as advertising, critical reviews, and word of 
mouth; and latent product interest which in turn influences post choice decisions such as 
whether or not to “spread the word” or otherwise recommend the experience to others 
(Neelamegham & Jain, 1999).  As an exceptionally powerful component of demand for a 
product or service, this word of mouth interaction has particularly important implications 
for the positive network externalities discussed in later sections.  Since quality (and 
value) is determined post hoc, players may find that firms compete aggressively for them 
to try their game for some initial period (Villas-Boas, 2006).  Interestingly, firms which 
command a large market share are able to price significantly higher as these firms are 
able to take advantage of a relatively larger population of consumers who experience a 
better “fit” with the product.  Companies generally concern themselves with ensuring that 
networks are stable with sufficient bandwidth, that there is sufficient server space for 
game play, and that customer service is adequate given the game’s community and the 
requirements of said community.  Return policies are a difficult subject with experience 
goods as players may form post-purchase regrets for a variety of reasons (Chee, 1996), 
some of which may be induced by switching costs.  Given that some games allow players 
to engage in game play prior to have an outlay of funds, it is possible to view the trial 
period as a variation of the “return policy.” 
1.5 Common Streams of Revenue & Pricing Approaches 
Building a sustainable revenue model has proved to be challenging for a number 
of online gaming companies (MacInnes & Hu, 2007) as many game developers and 
publishers are forced to direct their efforts towards technical and game-environment 
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issues.  Media reports that perhaps as many as thirty-three revenue schemes may exist 
(Perry, 2008), and as a result, numerous pricing related research efforts exist.  Two-part 
pricing models (those models with both a fixed as well as a usage-based cost to 
consumer) have been applied to online games due to the presence of strong network 
externalities and the useful life-span of the game as a function of the rate of creative 
destruction (Meagher & Teo, 2005).  Efforts have been made to map business models in 
MMO games (Alves & Roque, 2005).  Other efforts have presented MMO game business 
models as being one of two options: as a portal which allows access to games, or on 
subscriptions permitting presence in the virtual environment (Sharp & Rowe, 2006).   
Information goods and pricing of such have been topics of interest within the 
research community for several years.  In cases where there are two firms providing a 
similar service, two different pricing schemes have been studied.  In terms of subscription 
pricing versus pay-per-use, there are stable equilibrium in a few special cases; however, 
direct competition on the basis of price will usually prove destructive to all parties 
involved (Fishburn & Odlyzko, 1999).  A selection of current MMO offerings from 
different game providers is listed in Table 3.  There are five basic pricing models: Fixed 
Purchase Price, Fixed Purchase Price plus Subscription, Subscription, Limited Free Play, 
and Free Play.   
19 
 
Table 1.3 – Current MMO games 
Game Pricing Subscribers (in 000’s) 
World of Warcraft 
(Activision Blizzard) 
$39.99 Installation/Expansion 
$14.99 Monthly Subscription* 
$13.99 Three Month Subscription* 
$12.99 Six Month Subscription* 
> 11,500 (Blizzard, 2008) 
EVE Online 
(CCP) 
Free Installation  
Free Seven Day Trial Subscription 
$14.95 Monthly Subscription* 
$12.95 Three Month Subscription* 
$11.95 Six Month Subscription* 
$10.95 Twelve Month Subscription* 
> 300 (Cohen, 2009) 
Runescape 
(Jagex Games) 
Free Limited Play 
$7.50 Monthly Subscription* 
$6.495 Two Month Subscription* 
$5.997 Three Month Subscription* 
$5.831 Six Month Subscription* 
$5.583 Twelve Month Subscription* 
> 200,000 (Saltzman, 2012) 
Pirates of The Burning Sea 
(Flying Lab) 
Free Limited Play > 15 (Flying Lab, 2012) 
Farmville 
(Zynga) 
Free Limited Play 
 
> 10,000 (WSJ, 2009) 
Evony 
(Evony) 
Free Limited Play > 10,000 (Evony, 2010) 
Guild Wars 
(NC Soft) 
Single Purchase > 6,500 (Joystiq, 2010) 
Battlefield Heroes 
(EA) 
Free Limited Play > 1,500 (Kotaku, 2009) 
 *  indicates a per-month price  
 
 
1.5.1 Single (Per Unit) Purchase Price 
The first model requires players to purchase the game (either at a retailer or 
online) and then requires no additional fees from the consumer.  While such pricing is not 
typically representative of MMO games, examples of this strategy do exist (Arena Net, 
2010).  Guild Wars, developed by Arena Net and published by NC Soft, allows 
customers to download the game client for a fee or purchase the client at a different 
retailer without the financial burden of subscription fees.  Other examples of subscription 
free multi-player support include Age of Empires III (Ensemble Studios, 2010) where a 
free Ensemble Studios Online account is included with the initial purchase of the game, 
and StarCraft by Blizzard Entertainment (Blizzard Entertainment, 2010) where a 
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Battle.net account is included with initial purchase.  MMOs and specifically Blizzard 
Entertainment’s success in the multiplayer StarCraft platform has been studied with 
respect to how it has changed or shaped changes in cultures (Huhh, 2008). 
1.5.2 Subscription 
The second model does not require the purchase of the game software, but it does 
require players to purchase a subscription to play the game.  Users have full access to all 
of the game features upon subscription to the game service, typically following the 
expiration of some form of a free or complimentary trial period offering.  For example, 
CCP’s client for its MMO offering, EVE Online, is available for download for free from 
the game’s web portal and has been intentionally seeded by CCP into BitTorrent. 
1.5.3 Single Purchase Price Plus Subscription 
The third model requires players to purchase the game (either at a retailer or 
online) and then purchase a monthly subscription.  Users under this pricing model have 
full access to the features available from the publisher for the duration of their 
subscription.  Usually, the initial purchase of the game includes a short (i.e. 30 days) free 
subscription period upon completion of which, the user must begin paying for access to 
the game and its features.  The largest online game in terms of market share, World of 
Warcraft (Blizzard Entertainment, 2010), uses such a model.  World of Warcraft has been 
studied as a means of examining characteristics of MMOs that appeal to consumers 
(Ducheneaut, Yee, Nickell, & Moore, 2006). 
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1.5.4 Limited vs. Fully Free Play 
The fourth model, limited free play or fully free play, may come in a variety of 
forms.  Users are faced with a set of restrictions.  These may be restrictions in terms of 
Character Classes or Subclasses in the case of RPGs, Weapons or Items in the case of 
FPS games, Premium/Unique Items in the case of Social Games or RTS games, or Map 
Access in any of the above.  Presence of advertising may also be considered a restriction. 
Players have these restrictions removed by either subscribing to the game service, 
or by engaging in microtransactions.  Microtransactions (Snider, 2010) are the purchase 
of in-game credits for the goal of exchanging such credits for rare or useful items or the 
direct purchase of said items.  In effect, some percentage of the development investment 
is given away while a fee is charged to the players for access to the remainder.  With 
some games (i.e. Travian, Sims, Battlefield Heroes, Lineage) players convert real 
currency into virtual currency (or game credits) with which useful items can be purchased 
within the game.  Bringing real money into a virtual environment can be controversial at 
best.  Different groups of players, all with different motivations for playing the game, 
view the infusion of real currency differently.  Some view this action (legal or otherwise) 
as cheating while others view it much more favorably (Lehdonvirta V. , 2005).  Further, 
experiments have been conducted by corporations where a fee is charged for a small set 
of changes to a player’s account as has been the case with most of the games delivered by 
Facebook as well as games such as Ultima Online, a MMORPG by Electronic Arts. 
In some games, advertising is presented to players.  Occasionally, such 
advertising is presented to both paying and non-paying players; however, it may be 
presented only to non-paying players.   Advertising comes in a variety of forms (Faber, 
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Lee, & Nan, 2004) and may include pop-up ads, sponsorships, ads embedded in the game 
environment, banner ads, pull down menu banner ads, affiliated commercial sites, and so 
on.  Indeed, ad revenue is critical to certain games’ sustainability to the degree that these 
games are called Advergames (Faber, Lee, & Nan, 2004).  Embedded (in-game) 
advertising has grown in popularity among markets such that there are corporations who 
now specialize exclusively in ad placement (dynamic and otherwise) for games.  While it 
has been proposed that four types of advergames exist, it is interesting to note that this 
phenomenon has now developed to the point that some games have been designed wholly 
or at least to some degree to deliver a message to a player to change a real world behavior 
(Svahn, 2005).  Within game environments, due perhaps to the highly immersive nature 
of the games, players may have difficulty recalling embedded billboards and as such have 
a lower than anticipated effect on a player’s willingness or tendency to modify real-world 
behavior (Chaney, Lin, & Chaney, 2004); however, higher (more sophisticated) levels of 
ad integration into the game (environment and mechanics) is generally met with higher 
levels of recall for brands which the gamer is already aware of (Winkler & Buckner, 
2006).  Where advertising enhances the realism of the game environment, many players 
have been found to actually welcome the presence of such ads (Nelson, Keum, & Yaros, 
2004).  Not all gamers support advertising with the game environment as is illustrated by 
the virtual terrorist organization self dubbed the Second Life Liberation Army and its 
actions against advertisers (Steiner, 2008). 
There are a large number of free online games and services scattered across the 
Internet (Anderson, 2008).  The final model, fully free play, involves the removal of all 
restrictions on items, map access, characters, etc. and enables users to fully explore the 
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game’s features.  Such free play does not expire (i.e. not a Trial), relying instead on 
donations, advertising, and the purchase of “non-essential customizations” such as 
specialized clothing or skins.   
1.6 Conclusion 
Over the previous sections, we have outlined a brief history of games and gaming.  
We have developed a list of critical distinctions between game types into a classification 
of games.  Discussions in previous sections allowed us to identify important factors in the 
valuation of certain types of games and to examine how companies can earn revenue 
from such games.  The objective of this dissertation is to examine two of these pricing 
models for multiplayer non-persistent games in greater detail.  The first model is the 
Single Purchase Model and assumes that an individual buys a game once and no longer 
must pay any additional sum to continue using the game.  The second model is the 
Subscription model wherein the player must make a periodic decision as to whether or 
not to continue playing the game.  Both models are examined analytically, through use of 
numerical examples, and in a simulation environment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: PRICING MODELS FOR ONLINE MULTIPLAYER GAMES 
 
 
2.1 Model 1: Single Purchase Model 
In the first model, players pay a one-time price for the game, but do not incur any 
additional fees that take the form of subscription.  We assume that these players, upon 
paying the purchase price, do not incur any additional costs in the form of buying 
additional features or other perks, or that such items or “boosts” or “buffs” are not 
available.  In this model, the game provider can choose to change the price of the game at 
the beginning of any period. 
Within this model the players receive a certain amount of satisfaction or utility 
from the game.  Due to network externalities, the number of active players is of concern 
for individuals looking to receive some amount of utility from the game.  Quantity sold 
directly influences the amount of active players.  Users receive satisfaction from a variety 
of sources within the game; however, the two most pertinent to MMO game play are the 
amount of features or depth of the game and the number of active players.  Games which 
lack depth are less likely to attract or retain a large player base as they are too mundane 
or do not give players sufficient room to explore.  Development costs in the form of 
innovative features and extensive content regularly draw and keep players which in turn 
cause an upward spiral in demand as the player base size increases.  Finally, players are 
sensitive to quality of service issues and as such, QoS (or the absence of QoS issues) 
represented by the company’s expenditures in providing a certain level of customer 
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service have a direct impact on the utility of a player in the game.  Use of a Cobb 
Douglas Utility Function permits the capture of a variety of factors and their relative 
influence on utility.  While this type of function was originally developed for describing 
the relationships between different factors of production, its numerous extensions include 
use to describe relationships of various factors and their effects on utility (Mas-Colell, 
Whinston, & Green, 1995).   
The utility for an online multiplayer game comes from its player base, the amount 
of content and its completeness, the level of service provided, and the degree to which a 
game is marketed to potential players.  In this model, we assume publishing effort as an 
exogenous constant and capture the interest of the player base in the game in period   via 
the number of players in the game in period    ,       .  This parameter is of particular 
import as network effects are considered key drivers of demand for products that exhibit 
strong network externalities, especially multiplayer games.  The importance of network 
externalities is captured by   in this model.  Content and service level are captured by the 
development cost and the service cost          respectively.  Table 2.1 contains the 
notation used throughout this model.  The mean utility a purchaser gets from a 
multiplayer online game in period   is best represented as: 
 
 
                   [1.1]  
26 
Table 2.1 – Notation used 
Symbol  Description 
    Purchase Price in period   
    Cost of Development (fixed cost incurred by the game developer) 
     Cost of Publishing (fixed cost incurred by the game publisher) in period   
     Cost of Service (variable cost incurred by the game provider) in period   
    Quantity of Games Sold in period   
    Utility of Game (as seen by the player) if purchased in  period   
    Number of Active Players in period   
   Size of Market Segment for Game Type/Genre combination  
   Discount Rate 
       Relative effects of    ,   , and    on Market Segment   
   Retention Rate 
   Pre-release market perception 
   Growth Factor 
   Beta Group Size 
    Initial period network effects       
 
A particular specification of the above function is a variation of the Cobb Douglas 
utility function: 
           
 
    
 
 [1.2]  
 
Where,           ,         , and          , are parameters of a particular game and   
is a constant.  Figure 2.1 shows the mean utility where    . 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Utility function 
 
 
We assume there is a nonnegative discount rate of   for both the future consumer utility 
and future revenue and define: 
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 [1.3]  
The total utility that a player obtains by buying the game in period t and playing until T 
is: 
 
      
      
   
   
 [1.4]  
Where        , represents the customers’ expectations of the game’s growth factor.   
The customers’ expectation of growth is a complex factor that is a function of several 
components including the topic or theme of the game and the popularity of this theme.  
This may be indicated by the presence of movies or TV shows that have a shared theme.  
Customers may expect the game to become popular or not due to the genera of the game, 
the publisher’s reputation, as well as the presence of other media.  We use a discounted 
utility function since players who purchase a product early will enjoy it longer and will 
have more utility from the product.  This utility function captures the utility gained by a 
player in the period of purchase and of all future periods of use.  For an individual player, 
their utility is assumed to be uniformly distributed with mean of    and a range of       
where       on: 
 
                  [1.5]  
Players enter the game periodically and remain for some duration of time.  New 
entrants are captured via the quantity sold (Qt) while players who exit the game are 
represented by Lt.  Of importance is the notion of an active player base.  A game where 
the player base is small has less value as there are few opportunities for player-to-player 
interactions (whether in the form of team questing, PvP, or simply chatting).  No upper 
limit to the active player base size is assumed as MMO games are typically scalable by 
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design.  The size of the active player base at time period t (nt) is determined in part by the 
quantity of the game sold, the effectiveness of the game provider, and time.  Poor (or 
simply ineffective) customer service results in players leaving the game.  Other issues 
faced by the provider include the accessibility of the gaming experience.  As noted 
earlier, gamers may be intolerant with respect to connection quality.  Finally, games (like 
all products) follow some form of a life cycle.  In the moment in which the servers go 
“live” for the first time the life cycle begins.  While a game may continue indefinitely, we 
assume that a game “dies” when the company no longer feels that it is viable to continue 
providing service or support to existing customers and ceases efforts to acquire new or 
additional customers, or when n has reached a minimum at which point the game is no 
longer playable.  Since the game may be abandoned by either party at any point, we 
assume that both parties are equally able and willing to exit the playing environment. 
Players may choose to leave or exit a game for a variety of reasons.  Players may choose 
to leave due to 1) poor service level, 2) interactability issues, or 3) “Real Life” issues.  
Reductions in the player base due to service level changes may stem from connectivity 
issues or from issues related to poor customer service or an inadequate    expenditure.  
Interactability losses can be attributed to a player “completing” the game, a player getting 
“bored” with the game, or a player getting “stuck” in the game all of which depends on 
   in the form of features and content, documentation, and community tools.  The last of 
the three reasons that players leave a game, real life issues, cannot be influenced by the 
profit seeking entities and so is not considered.  The active player base of the game at any 
given time period (nt) is:   
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             [1.6]  
Where   is the mean retention rate,      .  We assume   is a game parameter that is 
exogenous and is unique to each game offered.  To simplify the analysis, we assume    
and    are given and thus we treat   as a constant to allow us to focus on the pricing 
aspects of this model.  Players choose to enter the game if: 
 
      [1.7]  
Assuming that players only purchase the game once, the quantity sold in period  :  
       
 
    
  
       
  
   
          
    
 [1.8]  
Substituting for    and integrating yields: 
        
    
   
   
 
          
    
 [1.9]  
The game publisher maximizes expected profit in problem SP1: 
                      
 
   
    [1.10]  
We assume that the beta testers must purchase a copy prior to playing the game post beta 
period: 
    
 
   
   [1.11]  
Additionally, the non-negativity constraints: 
 
              [1.12]  
and 
               [1.13]  
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2.1.1 Solution for Three Period Model 
For three time periods, closed form solutions to the first order conditions for    
and    exist so that   is a function of   .  This means that a 1-dimensional search can be 
used to find the optimal   .  We can show that the solutions satisfy the sufficient 
conditions for optimality for Proposition 1 in Proof 1.  We use three time periods for a 
product life cycle where we have three pricing levels: price at introduction, maturity, and 
decline.  Also, we hold        and        as exogenous.  In the first period      , 
we assume that        and    .  To simplify, let: 
 
     
   
 
 [1.14]  
 
 
         [1.15]  
 
 
2.1.1.1 Proposition 1 
For   sufficiently small, if                    , then the following 
solution to problem SP1: 
 
  
  
  
   
                               
     
    
                  
 [1.16]  
 
 
  
  
  
   
                            
     
        
                  
 [1.17]  
And  
 
  
   
    
   
   
     
      
   
                            
               
                                
  
             
                      
              
   
                       
 
   
[1.18]  
Satisfies the necessary optimality conditions.  Where to simplify: 
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       [1.19]  
 
 
       [1.20]  
 
 
         [1.21]  
 
 
       [1.22]  
 
2.1.1.2 Proof 1 
Solving: 
 
  
   
   [1.23]  
Yields 
   
   
   
                              
     
    
                 
 [1.24]  
Substituting   
  into   and solving: 
 
  
   
   [1.25]  
Yields  Equation 1.17 as well as Equation 1.16 after some substitution.  Substituting back 
into Z and computing 
  
   
 yields Equation 1.18.  To examine the concavity of   in    we 
compute: 
   
   
  
   
     
   
   
        
   
              
    
                             
     
            
                           
               
   
 
                       
  
[1.26]  
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Equation 1.25 is discontinuous at: 
  
       
   
 [1.27]  
The limit of   where   is the numerator of Equation 1.25 is  
    
   
          
          
[1.28]  
Thus the sign is determined by the sign of the denominator.  Solving the following for    
 
                       
    
[1.29]  
Yields: 
 
     
                
      
 [1.30]  
The game publisher will not set a price beyond the maximum utility      so we observe 
that subtracting the maximum utility from Equation 1.29 yields: 
 
 
                    
      
 [1.31]  
If                    then     is greater than the maximum utility and   is 
concave on          and the proof is complete. 
 
2.1.2 Numerical Example 
With the following parameters, we find a solution for the single purchase model 
where    . 
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Table 2.3.1 – Single purchase model numerical example 
Symbol Value Definition 
  0.5 Relative Importance of    
  0.5 Relative Importance of    
  1 Relative Importance of      
  5,000,000 Population Size  
      Quantity Sold During Beta 
  15,000 Number of Beta Testers 
   600,000 Development Cost 
   50,000 Publishing Cost 
   100,000 Service Cost 
  50 Pre-release market perception 
  1 Customers’ Expectation of Growth 
  0.5 Retention Rate During Period 
  0.0 Discount Rate 
  2 Spread of Uniform Distribution 
  0.00000000001 Scaling Constant 
 
 
The following solution reflects the optimal values for the decision variables    as   is 
maximized: 
 
Table 2.3.2 – Optimal prices 
Decision Variable Value 
   5.876 
   12.064 
   5.936 
  31,940,898.000 
 
 
The values for certain important variables for each period are shown in Table 2.3.3. 
 
Table 2.3.3 – Period values 
Variable Value Variable Value 
   5.511    2,334,885.0 
   11.439    2,423,544.0 
   5.936    1,912,529.0 
    
   13,526,761.0    2,327,385.0 
   15,004,132.0    1,256,102.0 
   4,010,005.0    700,757.0 
      4,284,243.0 
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2.2 Model 2: Subscription 
The following model assumes that players obtain the game without a one-time 
purchase cost but incurs periodic subscription fee,    to play.  Some changes in notation 
are necessary and are reflected in Table 2.4. 
 
Table 2.4 – Symbols used 
Symbol  Description 
    Subscription Fee in period   
    Utility of Game as seen by a player in period   
    Quantity of Game Subscriptions sold in  period   
 
 
We use the same variation of the Cobb Douglas utility function as in the Single 
Purchase model on the same distribution, where: 
           
 
    
 
 [2.1]  
Where,                     , and          , are parameters of a particular game.  A 
player chooses to pay the subscription fee if: 
       [2.2]  
Since players subscribe for one period at time  , there are     potential players in the 
market at the beginning of each period.  The number of game subscriptions purchased 
during period t is: 
 
     
 
    
  
       
  
  
          
    
 [2.3]  
Which gives: 
 
    
  
    
 
    
         
    
    
 
    
 
 [2.4]  
The firm maximizes the expected profit given by problem SM1: 
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    [2.5]  
After some substitution: 
 
           
          
    
         
 
   
    [2.6]   
Subject to: 
                 [2.7]  
And 
      [2.8]  
 
 
2.2.1 Solution for Three Period Model 
We hold certain assumptions about game parameters as shown in Table 2.5.  In 
this model, for    , closed form solutions exist.  We can show that the solutions satisfy 
the sufficient conditions for optimality for Proposition 2 in Proof 2 through the Hessian 
matrix. 
2.2.1.1 Proposition 2 
If   
        
 
 
 
 
   
 
   
 
    , then the optimal solutions for SM1 are given 
by: 
 
  
  
                   
        
 [2.9]   
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
     
   
  
  [2.10]  
 
 
  
   
 
   
               
            
 
      [2.11]  
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Where to simplify, let: 
         
 
 [2.12]  
 
                                           [2.13]  
 
                                  
 
   [2.14]  
 
 
2.2.1.2 Proof 2 
Solving: 
   
   
   [2.15]  
Yields Equation 2.9.  After substituting    into  , we can compute: 
 
   
   
  
   
        
                      
             
             
   [2.16]  
 
 
   
      
 
   
      
 
          
          
 
  [2.17]  
and  
    
   
  
   
       
 [2.18]  
Since    must be less than the maximum utility           ,         
        .  Thus the sign of 
   
   
  is determined by the sign of the numerator: 
                                                   [2.19]  
To examine    we compute: 
 
   
  
            
  [2.20]  
Since 
   
  
        is strictly increasing in   .  Solving: 
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   [2.21]  
Yields: 
          
                 
  
 
 
 
 [2.22]  
Since 
 
                 
  
 
 
 
   [2.23]  
 
          and    is negative on the range         .  Next we compute: 
    
   
   
 
   
   
   
   
      
 
 
 [2.24]  
We must show that     .  From Equation 2.24 above: 
     
     
        
            
                 
           
 
 [2.25]  
Examining the denominator of Equation 2.25, we observe that since       
        .  Thus, the sign is determined by  
 
         
        
            
                  
[2.26]  
We find that 
    
  
             
  [2.27]  
And since             
   ,    is decreasing in   .  We find that solving      
for    yields 
 
       
 
 
 
 
   
 
   
 
        [2.28]  
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For all reasonable parameter values     is much larger than 
 
 
 
 
   
 
   
 
   and therefore, 
we expect that the optimal   
  is below       
 
 
 
 
   
 
   
 
    and the proof is 
complete. 
2.2.2 Numerical Example 
As in the single purchase pricing model, with the following parameters, we find a 
solution where    . 
 
Table 2.6.1 – Subscription model numerical example 
Symbol Value Definition 
  0.5 Relative Importance of    
  0.5 Relative Importance of    
  1 Relative Importance of      
  5,000,000 Population Size  
      Quantity Sold During Beta 
  15,000 Number of Beta Testers 
   600,000 Development Cost 
   50,000 Publishing Cost 
   100,000 Service Cost 
  50 Pre-release market perception 
  1 Customers’ Expectation of Growth 
  0.5 Retention Rate During Period 
  0.0 Discount Rate 
  2 Spread of Uniform Distribution 
  0.00000000001 Scaling Constant 
 
 
The following solution reflects the optimal values for the decision variables    as   is 
maximized: 
 
Table 2.6.2 – Optimal prices 
Decision Variable Value 
   1.11 
   12.89 
   7.29 
  48,370,933 
 
 
The values for certain important variables as they change by period are in Table 2.6.3. 
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Table 2.6.3 – Period values 
Variable Value Variable Value 
   1.84    6,513,198 
   15.95    2,979,795 
   7.30    2,500,000 
    
   -7,392,472   
   38,265,962   
   18,097,443   
 
 
2.3 Conclusion 
The previous sections present a mathematical model for both a single purchase 
and subscription pricing strategies and provide a numerical example for each.  We 
present a solution for each model that satisfies the necessary optimality conditions.  
While the two models give numerical results, direct comparison of the amount charged as 
a single price or the subscription fee charged is not possible due to the nature of the 
utility functions.  However, the reader can compare the amount of total revenue earned 
through the use of each model.  The next chapter presents a numerical experiment that 
tests these models’ sensitivity to the various parameters discussed in the earlier sections 
and concludes with a discussion of the managerial implications of the findings of this 
experiment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: NUMERICAL EXPERIMENT 
 
 
3.1 Single Purchase Model 
3.1.1 Single Purchase Model With No Growth Expectation 
In this experiment we varied the game parameters and found the optimal pricing 
strategy for each the parameter combinations shown in Table 3.1.1.  For this experiment, 
we held    and    constant at     and     (no customers’ growth expectation and no 
discounting respectively).  When the customer does not expect a particular game to 
become more popular than it already is,   is 1.  However, when the opposite is the case 
and a game is of a type that is becoming fashionable or otherwise trending upwards in 
popularity,   is much larger than 1. 
The results from the experiments are shown in Table 3.1.2.  Table 3.1.3 is 
obtained from Table 3.1.2 and shows the profit per period as a percentage of the total 
profit and the quantity sold per period as a percentage of the total quantity sold.  Table 
3.1.3 also shows the price charged per period relative to the maximum price charged over 
the three periods, which is normalized to 1.  The results are illustrated in Figures 3.1.1 – 
3.1.12. 
Of all the parameters that we varied (  ,   ,   ,  ,  ,  ,  , and  ), we found  ,  ,  , 
and   to have significant effects.  Results produced by the model are consistent with 
patterns shown by certain games already in the market; see Table 3.1.2.  For all parameter 
combinations tested, certain trends hold: 
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 No pricing strategy completely clears the market 
 The quantity sold per period is decreasing in time   
 Initial period parameters     and     do not have impacts that last beyond the price 
set in the first period 
 A low introductory price to maximize sales is followed with a price that 
maximizes profit which is in turn followed by a final low price, an exception 
concerning market size is noted below 
The changes in the pricing strategy as a result of changes in the parameter   reflect the 
importance of proper pricing strategy with respect to the potential market size.  Large 
values of   result in the pricing strategy changing from a high introductory price to an 
introductory price that is considerably lower.  This pricing of games with small potential 
market in which large prices are charged in the first period runs counter to the “normal” 
pricing strategy of beginning with a low price to increase the number of players and 
increasing price as the customers’ utilities increase.  This change in the pricing strategy 
for games with small potential market is shown in Figure 3.1.2.  A small potential market 
makes it difficult to sell a large quantity in the first period and increase the price in period 
two to capitalize on the increased utility. 
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Table 3.1.1 – Parameter values for numerical experiment 
Parameter Level      Value 
   Low 200,000 
 Medium 600,000 
 High 1,000,000 
   Low 10,000 
 Medium 50,000 
 High 90,000 
   Low 50,000 
 Medium 100,000 
 High 150,000 
  Low 0.2 
 Medium 0.5 
 High 0.8 
  Low 2,000,000 
 Medium 5,000,000 
 High 8,000,000 
  Low 5,000 
 Medium 15,000 
 High 25,000 
  Low 20 
 Medium 50 
 High 80 
  Low 0.2 
 Medium 0.5 
 High 0.8 
 
 
The parameters   ,   ,   , and  , were found to have little impact on the pricing strategy 
or the quantity sold in different periods as illustrated in Table 3.1.2.  We did find that 
other parameters or game characteristics had a significant impact on the pricing strategy 
and the profit earned.  We found that varying  ,  ,  , and   resulted in considerable 
changes in prices and quantities sold in different periods as illustrated in Tables 3.1.2 and 
Table 3.1.3.  We now examine the effects of these parameters in greater detail. 
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Table 3.1.2 – Single purchase experiment results 
Parameter 
Levels 
  *   *   *   *           
  
Low    2,299 1,270    708 4,277 $   3.34 $   6.86 $  3.42 $  21,030 
Medium    2,299 1,270    708 4,277 $   6.27 $ 12.87 $  6.42 $  39,622 
High    2,299 1,270    708 4,277 $   8.59 $ 17.63 $  8.79 $  54,257 
Low    2,299 1,270    708 4,277 $   6.07 $ 12.45 $  6.21 $  38,423 
Medium    2,299 1,270    708 4,277 $   6.07 $ 12.45 $  6.21 $  38,303 
High    2,299 1,270    708 4,277 $   6.07 $ 12.45 $  6.21 $  38,183 
Low    2,299 1,270    708 4,277 $   4.75 $   9.74 $  4.86 $  29,887 
Medium    2,299 1,270    708 4,277 $   6.17 $ 12.67 $  6.32 $  38,990 
High    2,299 1,270    708 4,277 $   7.28 $ 14.95 $  7.45 $  46,032 
Low   2,299 1,270    708 4,277 $   3.25 $   6.66 $  3.32 $  19,995 
Medium   2,299 1,270    708 4,277 $   5.43 $ 11.14 $  5.55 $  34,146 
High   2,299 1,270    708 4,277 $   9.53 $ 19.56 $  9.75 $  60,768 
Low      942    493    275 1,710 $   5.96 $   5.13 $  2.48 $    7,853 
Medium   2,307 1,266    706 4,279 $   6.09 $ 12.49 $  6.21 $  33,436 
High   3,650 2,050 1,142 6,842 $   6.16 $ 19.74 $  9.94 $  73,621 
Low   2,251 1,298    723 4,272 $   2.09 $ 12.16 $  6.21 $  28,852 
Medium   2,309 1,265    705 4,280 $   6.09 $ 12.51 $  6.21 $  38,307 
High   2,339 1,246    695 4,280 $ 10.03 $ 12.70 $  6.20 $  47,750 
Low   2,252 1,292    720 4,265 $   2.49 $ 12.20 $  6.21 $  29,745 
Medium   2,307 1,266    706 4,279 $   6.09 $ 12.50 $  6.21 $  38,296 
High   2,339 1,251    698 4,287 $   9.62 $ 12.67 $  6.21 $  46,868 
Low   2,290 1,318    689 4,296 $   6.08 $ 11.99 $  4.55 $  36,724 
Medium   2,300 1,269    708 4,277 $   6.07 $ 12.45 $  6.20 $  38,285 
High   2,309 1,221    727 4,258 $   6.06 $ 12.92 $  7.88 $  39,901 
* in thousands         
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Table 3.1.3 – Single purchase experiment results analysis 
Parameter 
Levels 
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
    
  
  
    
  
  
    
  
  
    
  
    
  
    
Low    36% 50% 14% 49% 100% 50% 54% 30% 17% 
Medium    36% 50% 14% 49% 100% 50% 54% 30% 17% 
High    36% 50% 14% 49% 100% 50% 54% 30% 17% 
Low    36% 50% 14% 49% 100% 50% 54% 30% 17% 
Medium    36% 50% 14% 49% 100% 50% 54% 30% 17% 
High    36% 50% 14% 49% 100% 50% 54% 30% 17% 
Low    36% 50% 14% 49% 100% 50% 54% 30% 17% 
Medium    36% 50% 14% 49% 100% 50% 54% 30% 17% 
High    36% 50% 14% 49% 100% 50% 54% 30% 17% 
Low   36% 50% 14% 49% 100% 50% 54% 30% 17% 
Medium   36% 50% 14% 49% 100% 50% 54% 30% 17% 
High   36% 50% 14% 49% 100% 50% 54% 30% 17% 
Low  66% 28% 6% 100% 86% 42% 55% 29% 16% 
Medium   42% 46% 13% 49% 100% 50% 54% 30% 17% 
High   31% 54% 15% 31% 100% 50% 53% 30% 17% 
Low   16% 66% 19% 17% 100% 51% 53% 30% 17% 
Medium   36% 50% 14% 49% 100% 50% 54% 30% 16% 
High   49% 40% 11% 79% 100% 49% 55% 29% 16% 
Low   18% 64% 18% 20% 100% 51% 53% 30% 17% 
Medium   36% 50% 14% 49% 100% 50% 54% 30% 16% 
High   48% 41% 11% 76% 100% 49% 55% 29% 16% 
Low   38% 52% 10% 51% 100% 38% 53% 31% 16% 
Medium   36% 50% 14% 49% 100% 50% 54% 30% 17% 
High   35% 48% 17% 47% 100% 61% 54% 29% 17% 
 
 
3.1.2 Effects of Game and Environmental Characteristics 
 
3.1.2.1 Population Size     
 
For low values of  , the publisher will start with a high price, thus obtaining the 
majority of profits in the first period; see Figure 3.1.1.  This is because the market size is 
small and the publisher cannot significantly increase the utility of the game for the 
consumers without selling to most of them and eroding future potential revenues.  For 
higher values of  , the publisher is able to increase the utility of the game in the second 
period by increasing the size of the player base in the first period, while still retaining 
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large revenue potential due to the large market size.  During period 1, for all values of   
tested, the publisher will sell the most copies, with subsequent periods having sales that 
are decreasing over time; see Figure 3.1.3. 
Of all the parameters tested,   is the only parameter found that will cause a 
change in the pricing pattern and reduce the ability of the publisher to use network 
externalities to increase profits.  These characteristics of the parameter   suggest that for 
a small game, one which has a limited market or potential fan base, it is best to follow a 
strategy of higher prices in earlier periods similar to a skimming strategy where a 
publisher gradually lowers price over time in order to capture the maximum amount of 
consumer surplus. 
Figure 3.1.1 shows that most of the profit for small games is earned in early 
periods.  For all values of   tested, we find that    is decreasing in  , see Figure 3.1.3.  
This is due to the need to sell a large number of copies of the game early in its lifecycle in 
order to maximize consumer utility through network externalities.   
 
 
Figure 3.1.1: Single purchase Zt/Z over time for different market sizes  
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Figure 3.1.2: Single purchase Pt/PMax over time for different market sizes 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1.3: Single purchase Qt/Q over time for different market sizes  
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3.1.2.2 Beta Test Group Size     
For low values of  , initial consumer utility is low and therefore the game 
publisher introduces a low price to increase utility via quantity sold.  The percentage of 
total profit earned in period 1 increases alongside rising values for  , see Figure 3.1.4, 
since larger    means higher initial consumer utility.  Prices in periods two and three do 
not appreciably change with respect to the same increases in  , see Figure 3.1.5, due to 
the fact that customer utility is increased as a result of the expanded beta test group size.  
As was the case for  , the percentage of copies sold in each period relative to all periods 
combined does not change significantly with respect to   as is shown in Figure 3.1.6.  
This stems from the publisher’s need to maximize consumer utility in the first period.  
Again, similar to  , values of   above a certain level may cause the publisher to set the 
price at a point that runs counter to traditional considerations about the impact of network 
externalities.  When   is large, the prices in the first two periods become closer to each 
other.   
 
 
Figure 3.1.4: Single purchase Zt/Z over time for different beta test group sizes 
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 Figure 3.1.5: Single purchase Pt/PMax over time for different beta test group sizes 
 
 
 Figure 3.1.6: Single purchase Qt/Q over time for different beta test group sizes 
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3.1.2.3 Pre-Release Market Perception Coefficient     
As with the beta group test size, the percentage of total profit earned in period 1 
increases alongside increases in the pre-release market perception coefficient  , see 
Figure 3.1.7.  This is because the publisher is able to price the game at a relatively high 
price in early periods when initial demand is high, see Figure 3.1.8.  Additionally, the 
price in the first period changes with respect to changing values for   while prices in 
subsequent periods do not appreciably change with respect the same increases in   
because this parameter mostly impacts customer utility in the first period.    exhibits the 
same impact on the pricing behavior as the aforementioned parameters as measured by 
percentage of quantity sold relative to total quantity sold, Figure 3.1.9, as the publisher 
must price the game so as to achieve a maximum number of sales in the early periods to 
take advantage of network externalities.  Certain games are in a genre that is particularly 
popular at one particular time or another.  That, when combined with a proper level of 
marketing effort     , will result in a game’s release being more anticipated or more 
eagerly looked forward to by potential players.  The model does not consider this 
relationship in its current form.  Additionally, professional reviews or hype surrounding a 
game’s release contribute to the popularity of a game during its initial phases. 
50 
 
Figure 3.1.7: Single purchase Zt/Z over time for different   
 
 
 
Figure 3.1.8: Single purchase Pt/PMax over time for different   
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Figure 3.1.9: Single purchase Qt/Q over time for different   
 
 
3.1.2.4 Retention Rate     
Increased retention rate     values result in a lower percentage of profits for the 
initial two periods, however, the final period will experience increased percentage of total 
profit relative to the different changes in  ; refer to Figure 3.1.10.  This is because the 
game publisher is assured of a higher level of utility for the consumer so long as retention 
rates remain high.  Also, the values for   have little impact on the prices charged for the 
first two periods, but result in considerable changes in the prices charged for the final 
period, see Figure 3.1.11, as the publisher is able to charge a higher price in the final 
period because of the increased utility stemming from a high retention rate.  Finally, the 
percentage of quantity sold relative to total quantity sold reflects its largest change when 
varying  , particularly for the second period when compared to the earlier parameters’ 
effects on the second period, see Figure 3.1.12.  While retention rate cannot directly 
impact the price set in the initial period, subsequent periods have a higher level of 
consumer utility and as such will have a higher price set by the publisher.  For players 
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who are retained by the game, they contribute to the overall utility of purchasers in 
subsequent periods.  For periods       , player retention becomes increasingly 
important.  As with all products that exhibit network externalities, the price charged is a 
function of the size of the player base and as such, a greater player base will result in the 
publisher being able to charge a higher price. 
 
 
Figure 3.1.10: Single purchase Zt/Z over time for different retention rates 
 
 
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
60% 
1 2 3 
0.2 
0.5 
0.8 
53 
 
Figure 3.1.11: Single purchase Pt/PMax over time for different retention rates 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1.12: Single purchase Qt/Q over time for different retention rates 
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3.1.3 Single Purchase Model with Moderate Growth Expectations 
For this experiment, we used a customer growth expectation of    .  This 
resulted in several changes in the patterns observed earlier as shown in Tables 3.1.4 and 
3.1.5.  Because of higher growth expectations, the publisher does not have to rely as 
heavily on actual network externalities and can charge a higher price in earlier periods 
and the majority of profit is earned in the first period with significantly less being earned 
in subsequent periods.  As shown in Figures 3.1.13 and 3.1.14, for small and medium 
sized markets, for certain parameters, the game is initially priced higher and then is 
priced low in the final period due to the game publisher being able to use the customer 
growth expectation.  This results in a majority of the profit being earned early in the 
game’s lifecycle.  For small beta test group sizes, the game must be priced low because 
the publisher needs a large number of sales in order to build customer utility in the 
following periods.  This means that the greatest amount of revenue is earned in the 
following period as actual network externalities begin to have an effect on the customer 
utility instead of only customer expectations, see Figures 3.1.15 and 3.1.16.  For medium 
and high levels of beta test group sizes the game publisher prices the product higher as 
network externalities have less impact in the second period.  The retention rate of 
customers does not have as significant an impact in this experiment as the customers’ 
own expectation of growth overrides some of the impacts that a low retention rate can 
have on customer utility via network externalities, see Figures 3.1.17 and 3.1.18.  For all 
parameters tested in this experiment, the effects are such that the quantity sold by the 
publisher is decreasing as   increases and other patterns noted in the previous section 
hold. 
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Table 3.1.4 – Single purchase experiment results       
Parameter 
Levels 
  *   *   *   *           
  
Low    2420 1245 660 4325 $  13.99 $  14.09 $    3.47 $   58,171.02 
Medium    2420 1245 660 4325 $  26.25 $  26.43 $    6.51 $ 109,299.33 
High    2420 1245 660 4325 $  35.95 $  36.20 $    8.91 $ 149,692.39 
Low    2420 1245 660 4325 $  25.40 $  25.58 $    6.29 $ 105,840.91 
Medium    2420 1245 660 4325 $  25.40 $  25.58 $    6.29 $ 105,720.91 
High    2420 1245 660 4325 $  25.40 $  25.58 $    6.29 $ 105,600.91 
Low    2420 1245 660 4325 $  19.87 $  20.01 $    4.92 $   82,630.50 
Medium    2420 1245 660 4325 $  25.84 $  26.02 $    6.40 $ 107,585.18 
High    2420 1245 660 4325 $  30.48 $  30.70 $    7.55 $ 126,947.06 
Low   2420 1245 660 4325 $  13.58 $  13.68 $    3.37 $   56,047.40 
Medium   2420 1245 660 4325 $  22.71 $  22.87 $    5.63 $   94,442.60 
High   2420 1245 660 4325 $  39.89 $  40.18 $    9.89 $ 166,672.75 
Low   976 490 260 1725 $  25.20 $  10.36 $    2.51 $   29,383.15 
Medium   2424 1243 659 4326 $  25.42 $  25.62 $    6.29 $   97,052.75 
High   3859 2003 1062 6923 $  25.56 $  40.74 $  10.08 $ 190,726.84 
Low   2395 1262 669 4326 $    8.60 $  25.26 $    6.30 $   64,461.64 
Medium   2427 1242 659 4327 $  25.43 $  25.65 $    6.29 $ 105,769.83 
High   2438 1231 653 4322 $  42.16 $  25.82 $    6.29 $ 146,931.27 
Low   2394 1258 667 4318 $  10.29 $  25.30 $    6.29 $   68,465.90 
Medium   2425 1242 659 4326 $  25.42 $  25.63 $    6.29 $ 105,715.64 
High   2440 1235 655 4330 $  40.47 $  25.79 $    6.30 $ 142,981.20 
Low   2419 1268 649 4336 $  25.39 $  25.08 $    4.48 $ 104,137.77 
Medium   2420 1245 660 4325 $  25.40 $  25.58 $    6.29 $ 105,710.69 
High   2421 1222 671 4314 $  25.40 $  26.07 $    8.11 $ 107,314.28 
* in thousands         
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Table 3.1.5 – Single purchase experiment results analysis       
Parameter 
Levels 
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
    
  
  
    
  
  
    
  
  
    
  
    
  
    
Low    58% 37% 5% 99% 100% 25% 56% 29% 15% 
Medium    58% 37% 5% 99% 100% 25% 56% 29% 15% 
High    58% 37% 5% 99% 100% 25% 56% 29% 15% 
Low    58% 37% 5% 99% 100% 25% 56% 29% 15% 
Medium    58% 37% 5% 99% 100% 25% 56% 29% 15% 
High    58% 37% 5% 99% 100% 25% 56% 29% 15% 
Low    58% 37% 5% 99% 100% 25% 56% 29% 15% 
Medium    58% 37% 5% 99% 100% 25% 56% 29% 15% 
High    58% 37% 5% 99% 100% 25% 56% 29% 15% 
Low   58% 37% 5% 99% 100% 25% 56% 29% 15% 
Medium   58% 37% 5% 99% 100% 25% 56% 29% 15% 
High   58% 37% 5% 99% 100% 25% 56% 29% 15% 
Low   82% 16% 2% 100% 41% 10% 57% 28% 15% 
Medium   63% 32% 4% 99% 100% 25% 56% 29% 15% 
High   52% 43% 6% 63% 100% 25% 56% 29% 15% 
Low   32% 61% 8% 34% 100% 25% 55% 29% 15% 
Medium   58% 37% 5% 99% 100% 25% 56% 29% 15% 
High   70% 27% 3% 100% 61% 15% 56% 28% 15% 
Low   36% 57% 7% 41% 100% 25% 55% 29% 15% 
Medium   58% 37% 5% 99% 100% 25% 56% 29% 15% 
High   69% 27% 3% 100% 64% 16% 56% 29% 15% 
Low   59% 38% 3% 100% 99% 18% 56% 29% 15% 
Medium   58% 37% 5% 99% 100% 25% 56% 29% 15% 
High   57% 36% 6% 97% 100% 31% 56% 28% 16% 
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Figure 3.1.13: Single purchase Zt/Z over time for different market sizes       
 
 
 Figure 3.1.14: Single purchase Pt/PMax over time for different market sizes       
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Figure 3.1.15: Single purchase Zt/Z over time for different   where     
 
 
 
Figure 3.1.16: Single purchase Pt/PMax over time for different   where     
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Figure 3.1.17: Single purchase Zt/Z over time for different retention rates       
 
 
 
Figure 3.1.18: Single purchase Pt/PMax over time for different retention rates       
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3.1.4 Single Purchase Model with High Growth Expectation 
For this experiment, we set the customer growth expectation at    .  A high 
level of customer growth expectation results in significant differences between the results 
of this experiment and those discussed in Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2.  The results of this 
experiment are shown in Tables 3.1.6 and 3.1.7.  In this experiment the profit earned in 
the first period is significantly higher than in previous experiments which are driven by 
the publisher charging the highest price in the first period due to the increased growth 
expectation.  For small and medium sized markets, network externalities are rendered 
meaningless as the customers’ utility function is dominated by the expectation of growth.  
This means that a game is priced high in initial periods and is priced low in the final 
period with a majority of the profit being earned in the initial period, see Figures 3.1.19 
and 3.1.20.  For large market sizes, the price does not begin to decline until the final 
pricing period.  This is because the customers expect a significant portion of the available 
market to purchase the game.  With the exception of small beta test group sizes, the game 
publisher will also price the game high in the initial period with subsequent periods 
seeing a reduced price, see Figures 3.1.21 and 3.1.22. 
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Table 3.1.6 – Single purchase experiment results       
Parameter 
Levels 
  *   *   *   *           
  
Low    2453 1240 646 4339 $  33.07 $  21.23 $    3.48 $  116,440 
Medium    2453 1240 646 4339 $  62.04 $  39.83 $    6.54 $  218,614 
High    2453 1240 646 4339 $  84.97 $  54.56 $    8.95 $  299,417 
Low    2453 1240 646 4339 $  60.03 $  38.54 $    6.33 $  211,610 
Medium    2453 1240 646 4339 $  60.03 $  38.54 $    6.33 $  211,490 
High    2453 1240 646 4339 $  60.03 $  38.54 $    6.33 $  211,370 
Low    2453 1240 646 4339 $  46.96 $  30.15 $    4.95 $  165,378 
Medium    2453 1240 646 4339 $  61.07 $  39.22 $    6.44 $  215,201 
High    2453 1240 646 4339 $  72.04 $  46.26 $    7.59 $  253,892 
Low   2453 1240 646 4339 $  32.10 $  20.61 $    3.38 $  112,609 
Medium   2453 1240 646 4339 $  53.69 $  34.47 $    5.66 $  189,040 
High   2453 1240 646 4339 $  94.29 $  60.55 $    9.94 $  332,822 
Low  984 490 255 1730 $  59.78 $  15.53 $    2.53 $    66,131 
Medium   2457 1239 645 4340 $  60.05 $  38.59 $    6.33 $  198,996 
High   3920 1992 1037 6948 $  60.25 $  61.50 $  10.13 $  369,345 
Low   2439 1252 652 4343 $  20.19 $  38.24 $    6.33 $  112,980 
Medium   2458 1238 644 4341 $  60.06 $  38.62 $    6.33 $  211,618 
High   2463 1231 641 4334 $  99.82 $  38.77 $    6.32 $  309,873 
Low   2437 1249 650 4335 $  24.20 $  38.28 $    6.33 $  122,606 
Medium   2457 1239 645 4340 $  60.06 $  38.60 $    6.33 $  211,486 
High   2466 1234 642 4343 $  95.83 $  38.75 $    6.33 $  300,379 
Low   2454 1256 638 4347 $  60.02 $  38.02 $    4.47 $  209,890 
Medium   2453 1240 646 4339 $  60.03 $  38.54 $    6.32 $  211,483 
High   2453 1225 653 4332 $  60.04 $  39.06 $    8.18 $  213,098 
* in thousands         
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Table 3.1.7 – Single purchase experiment results analysis       
Parameter 
Levels 
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
    
  
  
    
  
  
    
  
  
    
  
    
  
    
Low    70% 28% 2% 100% 64% 11% 57% 29% 15% 
Medium    70% 28% 2% 100% 64% 11% 57% 29% 15% 
High    70% 28% 2% 100% 64% 11% 57% 29% 15% 
Low    70% 28% 2% 100% 64% 11% 57% 29% 15% 
Medium    70% 28% 2% 100% 64% 11% 57% 29% 15% 
High    70% 28% 2% 100% 64% 11% 57% 29% 15% 
Low    70% 28% 2% 100% 64% 11% 57% 29% 15% 
Medium    70% 28% 2% 100% 64% 11% 57% 29% 15% 
High    70% 28% 2% 100% 64% 11% 57% 29% 15% 
Low   70% 28% 2% 100% 64% 11% 57% 29% 15% 
Medium   70% 28% 2% 100% 64% 11% 57% 29% 15% 
High   70% 28% 2% 100% 64% 11% 57% 29% 15% 
Low  88% 11% 1% 100% 26% 4% 57% 28% 15% 
Medium   74% 24% 2% 100% 64% 11% 57% 29% 15% 
High   64% 33% 3% 98% 100% 16% 56% 29% 15% 
Low   43% 52% 4% 53% 100% 17% 56% 29% 15% 
Medium   70% 28% 2% 100% 64% 11% 57% 29% 15% 
High   79% 19% 2% 100% 39% 6% 57% 28% 15% 
Low   48% 48% 4% 63% 100% 17% 56% 29% 15% 
Medium   70% 28% 2% 100% 64% 11% 57% 29% 15% 
High   79% 20% 2% 100% 40% 7% 57% 28% 15% 
Low   70% 28% 2% 100% 63% 7% 56% 29% 15% 
Medium   70% 28% 2% 100% 64% 11% 57% 29% 15% 
High   69% 28% 3% 100% 65% 14% 57% 28% 15% 
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Figure 3.1.19: Single purchase Zt/Z over time for different market sizes       
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1.20: Single purchase Pt/PMax over time for different market sizes       
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 Figure 3.1.21: Single purchase Zt/Z over time for different   where     
 
 
 Figure 3.1.22: Single purchase Pt/PMax over time for different   where     
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3.2 Subscription Model 
Instead of a single purchase, for this experiment customers decide each period 
whether or not to purchase a subscription to the game from the publisher.  Unlike in the 
single purchase models where the market size decreases over time as players purchase the 
game, in the subscription model the market size remains the same as all players must 
decide whether or not to purchase a subscription.  Given these changes, certain 
parameters (customer growth expectation and customer retention rate) are no longer part 
of the model. The results of the analysis performed on the parameters in this model are 
shown in Tables 3.2.2 and 3.2.3.   
The results indicate that regardless of parameter examined or parameter level, the 
game is priced low in the initial period, high in the following period, and low in the final 
pricing period.  For large market sizes the price charged in the initial period and the 
revenue earned in said period are almost trivially low to the point that the publisher is 
doing little more than giving the game away.  The fact that the market does not 
completely clear during this initial period is due to the value that some portion of the 
initial market does not value the game.  While the following periods do have decreased 
sales numbers, the majority of revenue is earned in the period following a low price, see 
Figures 3.2.1 and 3.2.2.  The same phenomena are observed in the effects from varying 
the beta group test size as shown in Figures 3.2.3 and 3.2.4. 
Due to differences in how the utility function is designed between these two 
models, direct comparison of prices is not possible; however, we can make statements 
about which is more appropriate under certain conditions based on revenue.  Unlike in 
the single purchase strategy, a customer must decide each period whether or not to buy.  
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The relationship between prices charged in the single purchase model and the fees 
charged in the subscription model is outlined in Table 3.2.1.  A more detailed analysis of 
the differences between the price charged and the fees charged is located in Section 5. 
 
Table 3.2.1 – Price vs. fee comparison 
Period When Purchased Single Purchase Model Subscription Model 
1             
2          
3       
 
 
The subscription model follows the same general patterns established throughout 
Sections 3.1.1 through 3.1.4 of pricing the game low in the initial period and then higher 
in the period immediately following in order to capture the benefits of network 
externalities.  The differences in the actual values generated by the experiment are due to 
the fact that in the subscription model, growth is observed and customer expectations do 
not matter.  This forces the publisher to offer the game at a low price in the initial period 
for all parameter values unlike the single purchase model in which the publisher will 
charge a high price in the initial period under certain circumstances.  Additionally, the 
final period price is significantly higher in the subscription model when measured as a 
percentage of the maximum price charged.  This is because, despite the price increase 
between periods one and two, a significant portion of the potential market does purchase 
the game in period two because of the impacts of network externalities.  A more detailed 
discussion of these phenomena and their implications can be found in Section 3.5. 
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Table 3.2.2 – Subscription experiment results 
Parameter 
Levels 
  *   *   *   *           
  
Low    4846 3151 2500 10498 $   0.24 $     5.07 $     4.44 $     33,664 
Medium    4846 3151 2500 10498 $   0.45 $     9.51 $     8.34 $     63,323 
High    4846 3151 2500 10498 $   0.62 $   13.03 $  11.42 $     86,720 
Low    4846 3151 2500 10498 $   0.44 $     9.20 $     8.06 $     61,355 
Medium    4846 3151 2500 10498 $   0.44 $     9.20 $     8.06 $     61,235 
High    4846 3151 2500 10498 $   0.44 $     9.20 $     8.06 $     61,115 
Low    4846 3151 2500 10498 $   0.34 $     7.20 $     6.31 $     47,828 
Medium    4846 3151 2500 10498 $   0.45 $     9.36 $     8.21 $     62,323 
High    4846 3151 2500 10498 $   0.53 $   11.05 $     9.68 $     73,555 
Low   4846 3151 2500 10498 $   0.23 $     4.92 $     4.31 $     32,258 
Medium   4846 3151 2500 10498 $   0.39 $     8.23 $     7.21 $     54,656 
High   4846 3151 2500 10498 $   0.69 $   14.46 $  12.67 $     96,792 
Low   1716 1303 1000 4019 $   1.00 $     3.11 $     3.33 $       7,598 
Medium   4852 3148 2500 10500 $   0.28 $     9.22 $     8.06 $     49,193 
High   7970 5004 4000 16974 $   0.04 $   15.28 $  12.81 $   126,915 
Low   5000 3125 2500 10625 $   0.00 $     9.60 $     8.00 $     60,929 
Medium   4878 3146 2500 10524 $   0.31 $     9.28 $     8.05 $     61,092 
High   4661 3184 2500 10345 $   1.00 $     8.73 $     8.15 $     61,685 
Low   4993 3126 2500 10619 $   0.01 $     9.58 $     8.00 $     60,929 
Medium   4864 3148 2500 10512 $   0.34 $     9.25 $     8.06 $     61,108 
High   4682 3181 2500 10363 $   0.97 $     8.78 $     8.14 $     61,669 
* in thousands         
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Table 3.2.3 – Subscription experiment results analysis 
Parameter 
Levels 
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
    
  
  
    
  
  
    
  
  
    
  
    
  
    
Low    1% 59% 40% 5% 100% 88% 46% 30% 24% 
Medium    1% 59% 40% 5% 100% 88% 46% 30% 24% 
High    1% 59% 40% 5% 100% 88% 46% 30% 24% 
Low    1% 59% 40% 5% 100% 88% 46% 30% 24% 
Medium    1% 59% 40% 5% 100% 88% 46% 30% 24% 
High    1% 59% 40% 5% 100% 88% 46% 30% 24% 
Low    1% 59% 40% 5% 100% 88% 46% 30% 24% 
Medium    1% 59% 40% 5% 100% 88% 46% 30% 24% 
High    1% 59% 40% 5% 100% 88% 46% 30% 24% 
Low   1% 59% 40% 5% 100% 88% 46% 30% 24% 
Medium   1% 59% 40% 5% 100% 88% 46% 30% 24% 
High   1% 59% 40% 5% 100% 88% 46% 30% 24% 
Low  14% 47% 39% 30% 93% 100% 43% 32% 25% 
Medium   2% 58% 40% 3% 100% 87% 46% 30% 24% 
High   0% 60% 40% 0% 100% 84% 47% 29% 24% 
Low   0% 60% 40% 0% 100% 83% 47% 29% 24% 
Medium   1% 59% 40% 3% 100% 87% 46% 30% 24% 
High   3% 57% 40% 12% 100% 93% 45% 31% 24% 
Low   0% 60% 40% 0% 100% 84% 47% 29% 24% 
Medium   1% 59% 40% 4% 100% 87% 46% 30% 24% 
High   3% 57% 40% 11% 100% 93% 45% 31% 24% 
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Figure 3.2.1: Subscription Zt/Z over time for different market sizes  
 
 
 
Figure 3.2.2: Subscription Ft/FMax over time for different market sizes 
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Figure 3.2.3: Subscription Zt/Z over time for different beta test group sizes 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2.4: Subscription Ft/FMax over time for different beta test group sizes 
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3.3 Five Period Single Purchase Model  
The number of price changes was increased from 3 to 5 and we held     for 
this experiment in order to confirm the patterns observed in Section 3.1.  This problem 
was solved using the           command in Mathematica.  While the properties of the 
problem with     were examined in Proposition 1, we do not provide proof of 
optimality for    .  Table 3.3.1 lists the parameters varied in this experiment and their 
values.  Tables 3.3.2 – 3.3.4 show the results of this experiment for prices charged in 
each period, profits earned in each period, and quantity sold in each period, respectively.   
The results for this experiment were similar to those outlined in Section 3.1.1.  
Generally, the game publisher uses low prices in the first period to stimulate demand and 
then raises the price in the following period.  The prices in subsequent periods are 
decreasing over time.  The same pattern holds for the profits earned in that a majority of 
the profits are earned in the second period.  The same exception holds true in this 
experiment as in the earlier one for small market sizes.  When the market size is small the 
price is set high initially and then is lowered in subsequent periods with a majority of the 
profits earned being obtained in the first period.  These results are illustrated in Figures 
3.3.1 and 3.3.2.  All other parameters varied exhibited patterns consistent with the earlier 
experiment, an example of which can be seen in Figure 3.3.3 for size of the beta group. 
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Table 3.3.1 – 5 Period single purchase parameter values for numerical experiment 
Parameter Level Value 
   Constant  600,000 
   Constant  50,000 
   Constant  100,000 
  Constant 0.5 
  Low  2,000,000 
 Medium 5,000,000 
 High  8,000,000 
  Low  5,000 
 Medium  15,000 
 High  25,000 
  Low  20 
 Medium 50 
 High 80 
  Low  0.2 
 Medium 0.5 
 High 0.8 
 
 
Table 3.3.2 – 5 Period single purchase experiment results analysis for prices 
Parameter 
Levels 
  
    
  
  
    
  
  
    
  
  
    
  
  
    
  
Low   100% 98% 75% 42% 16% 
Medium   45% 100% 81% 45% 18% 
High   30% 100% 83% 43% 30% 
Low   17% 100% 86% 49% 19% 
Medium   45% 100% 81% 43% 20% 
High   71% 100% 78% 39% 33% 
Low   20% 100% 85% 43% 37% 
Medium   45% 100% 81% 43% 20% 
High   69% 100% 79% 44% 17% 
Low   48% 100% 63% 25% 8% 
Medium   45% 100% 81% 41% 18% 
High   43% 100% 98% 63% 45% 
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Table 3.3.3 – 5 Period single purchase experiment results analysis for profit 
Parameter 
Levels 
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
   
Low   56% 28% 12% 3% 0% 
Medium   32% 41% 20% 6% 1% 
High   22% 46% 23% 7% 1% 
Low   11% 52% 27% 9% 2% 
Medium   27% 44% 21% 6% 1% 
High   39% 38% 17% 5% 1% 
Low   13% 52% 26% 8% 1% 
Medium   27% 44% 21% 6% 1% 
High   38% 38% 18% 6% 1% 
Low   30% 49% 17% 4% 0% 
Medium   28% 44% 21% 6% 1% 
High   25% 39% 25% 9% 2% 
 
 
Table 3.3.4 – 5 Period single purchase experiment results analysis for quantity sold 
Parameter 
Levels 
  
    
  
    
  
    
  
    
  
    
Low   46% 25% 15% 9% 5% 
Medium   43% 27% 16% 9% 5% 
High   42% 27% 16% 10% 5% 
Low   41% 28% 17% 10% 5% 
Medium   44% 27% 16% 9% 5% 
High   45% 26% 15% 9% 4% 
Low   41% 28% 16% 10% 5% 
Medium   43% 27% 16% 9% 5% 
High   45% 26% 15% 9% 5% 
Low   43% 28% 16% 9% 4% 
Medium   43% 27% 16% 9% 5% 
High   43% 25% 16% 10% 6% 
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 Figure 3.3.1: 5 Period single purchase Pt/PMax over time for different market sizes 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3.2: 5 Period single purchase Zt/Z over time for different market sizes 
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Figure 3.3.3: 5 Period single purchase Pt/PMax over time for different   
 
 
3.4 Five Period Subscription Model 
As in Section 3.3, the number of price changes was increased from 3 to 5 for this 
experiment in order to confirm the patterns observed in Section 3.2.  Tables 3.4.1 – 3.4.3 
show the analysis of the results of this experiment for prices charged in each period, 
profits earned in each period, and quantity sold in each period, respectively.   
The results of this model show an interesting pattern in the prices set by the 
publisher.  The publisher begins with a low price to increase sales and follows this with a 
price increase to capitalize on the effects of network externalities.  In the following two 
periods, the price is lowered to again increase sales.  In the final period, the publisher 
raises the price to again capitalize on the effects of network externalities, see Figures 
3.4.2 – 3.4.3.  This price oscillation (low, high, low, high) occurs when the publisher 
chooses to change prices for the game more than three times over the life cycle of the 
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product.  With the subscription model, the importance of network externalities dominates 
all of the parameters tested without the same exceptions noted in Sections 3.1 and 3.3. 
 
Table 3.4.1 – 5 Period subscription experiment results analysis for prices 
Parameter 
Levels 
  
    
  
  
    
  
  
    
  
  
    
  
  
    
  
Low   28% 93% 61% 61% 100% 
Medium   3% 100% 53% 56% 91% 
High   0% 100% 51% 55% 88% 
Low   0% 100% 50% 55% 88% 
Medium   3% 100% 52% 56% 90% 
High   11% 100% 56% 59% 96% 
Low   0% 100% 50% 55% 88% 
Medium   3% 100% 53% 56% 91% 
High   10% 100% 56% 59% 95% 
 
 
Table 3.4.2 – 5 Period subscription experiment results analysis for profit 
Parameter 
Levels 
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
   
Low   8% 28% 19% 20% 24% 
Medium   1% 34% 19% 21% 25% 
High   0% 35% 19% 21% 25% 
Low   0% 35% 19% 21% 25% 
Medium   0% 34% 19% 21% 25% 
High   2% 33% 19% 21% 25% 
Low   0% 35% 19% 21% 25% 
Medium   0% 34% 19% 21% 25% 
High   2% 33% 19% 21% 25% 
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Table 3.4.3 – 5 Period subscription experiment results analysis for quantity sold 
Parameter 
Levels 
  
    
  
    
  
    
  
    
  
    
Low   26% 19% 20% 20% 15% 
Medium   28% 18% 20% 20% 15% 
High   29% 18% 20% 20% 14% 
Low   29% 18% 20% 20% 14% 
Medium   28% 18% 20% 20% 14% 
High   27% 18% 20% 20% 15% 
Low   29% 18% 20% 20% 14% 
Medium   28% 18% 20% 20% 14% 
High   27% 18% 20% 20% 15% 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4.1: 5 Period subscription Ft/FMax over time for different market sizes 
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Figure 3.4.2: 5 Period subscription Zt/Z over time (T) for different market sizes 
 
 
Figure 3.4.3: 5 Period subscription Ft/FMax over T for different beta test group sizes 
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3.5 Model Comparisons 
Comparisons of model performance are outlined in Table 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 for 
several three period experiments.  While comparisons of prices or quantity sold between 
model types is not possible, we can compare the revenues earned in each and for each 
period.  Respectively, these tables show the differences between the single purchase 
model with no customer growth and the subscription model and between the single 
purchase model with moderate customer growth and the subscription model again.  
Tables 3.5.3 and 3.5.4 show the percent change in profit of these differences.  Table 3.5.5 
provides a comparison between the prices charged in the different single purchase 
experiments and the subscription fees charged.  We note the following observations about 
the performance of these three models: 
 For products that exhibit network externalities, the size of the market is the most 
important of all the environmental characteristics  
 When there is no (or very little) customer growth expectation, the publisher 
should follow subscription pricing as this model provides superior profit levels 
except when the potential market size is small 
 Beyond a certain threshold of customer growth expectation, the publisher should 
follow a single purchase pricing strategy 
 If the customers believe that growth will be low and the publisher believes that 
the customers are wrong and that growth expectation is higher or will change, a 
subscription pricing strategy will provide more profit than a single purchase 
model 
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 If a subscription model is determined to be the strategy that best maximizes profit 
for the publisher, the publisher should oscillate prices to capitalize on network 
externalities 
 If the publisher is cash-starved or short term cash flow is a concern, the publisher 
should follow a  single purchase pricing model as this provides the greatest 
amount of revenue early in the game’s lifecycle 
 If the publisher feels uncertain about the long term prospects of the company with 
respect to survival (i.e. the company may cease to exist for reasons not related to 
the game being offered), the publisher should follow a single purchase pricing 
strategy regardless of customer growth expectation as this strategy provides the 
maximum amount of profit earned in the first pricing period due to the fact that 
customers who purchase during the initial period expect to be able to play the 
game for several additional periods 
It should be noted that this last point should be considered a “Nuclear Option” in that if a 
company promises to provide a gaming environment for a certain amount of time, the 
customers will expect the publisher to do just that.  It would be expected that the pre-
release market perception coefficient     would be significantly impacted for subsequent 
offerings in a negative way should the publisher choose to follow this action prematurely.   
Since the experiments in this chapter were conducted with a discount rate of zero, 
we anticipate that raising the discount rate will result in a reduced performance by the 
subscription model.  Specifically, we expect Tables 3.5.4 and 3.5.5 to show slightly 
different results with the presence of discounting. 
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Table 3.5.1 – Differences between     single purchase and subscription models 
Parameter 
Levels 
  
    
    
    
    
    
        
Low   $      4,384.73 $   (1,481.79) $   (2,647.91) $         255.42 
Medium   $    13,154.96 $ (13,178.90) $ (15,733.92) $ (15,757.50) 
High   $    22,560.67 $ (36,042.87) $ (39,812.15) $ (53,294.22) 
Low   $      4,750.23 $ (17,650.06) $ (19,177.16) $ (32,076.55) 
Medium   $    13,809.39 $ (17,229.35) $ (19,365.15) $ (22,785.43) 
High   $    21,540.74 $ (15,824.15) $ (19,651.67) $ (13,935.32) 
Low   $      5,669.63 $ (17,649.53) $ (19,203.95) $ (31,184.15) 
Medium   $    13,709.35 $ (17,148.80) $ (19,372.54) $ (22,812.09) 
High   $    20,721.38 $ (15,905.23) $ (19,617.49) $ (14,801.06) 
in thousands     
 
 
Table 3.5.2 – Differences between     single purchase and subscription models 
Parameter 
Levels 
  
    
    
    
    
    
        
Low   $    23,396.33 $      1,068.01 $   (2,678.77) $   21,785.57 
Medium   $    60,977.13 $      2,859.91 $ (15,977.79) $   47,859.25 
High   $    99,199.19 $      5,103.01 $ (40,490.58) $   63,811.62 
Low   $    20,741.08 $      2,329.96 $ (19,537.96) $      3,533.09 
Medium   $    61,680.19 $      2,676.12 $ (19,678.91) $   44,677.40 
High   $  101,151.39 $      4,024.85 $ (19,930.28) $   85,245.96 
Low   $    24,803.30 $      2,293.05 $ (19,559.60) $      7,536.75 
Medium   $    61,536.66 $      2,757.82 $ (19,686.92) $   44,607.55 
High   $    97,232.70 $      3,980.07 $ (19,900.64) $   81,312.13 
in thousands     
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Table 3.5.3 – Percent change in profit between     single purchase vs. subscription  
Parameter 
Levels 
 
  
    
 
  
  
 
  
    
 
  
  
 
  
    
 
  
  
 
     
  
 
Low   378% -38% -83% 3% 
Medium   1340% -46% -79% -32% 
High   15647% -47% -78% -42% 
Low   -3167% -48% -78% -53% 
Medium   4246% -47% -78% -37% 
High   1021% -45% -79% -23% 
Low   -4308% -48% -78% -51% 
Medium   3310% -47% -78% -37% 
High   1035% -45% -79% -24% 
 
 
Table 3.5.4 – Percent change in profit between     single purchase vs. subscription 
Parameter 
Levels 
 
  
    
 
  
  
 
  
    
 
  
  
 
  
    
 
  
  
 
     
  
 
Low   2019% 28% -84% 287% 
Medium   6211% 10% -80% 97% 
High   68799% 7% -79% 50% 
Low   -13827% 6% -79% 6% 
Medium   18964% 7% -80% 73% 
High   4795% 11% -80% 138% 
Low   -18846% 6% -79% 12% 
Medium   14858% 8% -80% 73% 
High   4856% 11% -80% 132% 
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Table 3.5.5 – Price vs. subscription fee analysis 
 
 
Parameter 
Levels 
 
 
  
        
 
    
 
  
     
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
        
 
    
 
  
     
 
 
 
  
  
 
Low   0.80 0.80 0.74 3.39 1.61 0.75 
Medium   0.35 0.72 0.77 1.45 1.48 0.78 
High   0.22 0.70 0.78 0.91 1.45 0.79 
Low   0.12 0.69 0.78 0.49 1.44 0.79 
Medium   0.35 0.72 0.77 1.44 1.48 0.78 
High   0.56 0.75 0.76 2.36 1.53 0.77 
Low   0.14 0.69 0.78 0.59 1.44 0.79 
Medium   0.34 0.72 0.77 1.44 1.48 0.78 
High   0.54 0.75 0.76 2.26 1.52 0.77 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: SIMULATION 
 
 
4.1 Complex Adaptive Systems & Agent Based Modeling 
In this section of the paper, we propose the use of simulation tools in order to gain 
insight into the complex phenomena described in the earlier chapters.  Following a 
description of Complex Adaptive Systems and Agent Based Modeling simulations we 
present a discussion about the appropriateness of such systems for this type of research 
and the suitability of simulation tools in general for use in examining problems of the 
type detailed earlier.  We will then move into a discussion about the simulation system 
used in this study and its assumptions as well as provide a description of the overall 
design and operability of the simulation.  Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the 
results and implications of this experiment. 
 
4.1.1 Introduction to CAS & ABM 
 
 
Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) are a methodology for studying interrelated 
and complicated problems that do not lend themselves well to traditional empirical or 
mathematical models.  While CAS has been used to describe phenomena in the fields of 
physics, ecology, and weather systems, (Brownlee, 2007) it has also been used less often 
but also in the fields of business and economics.  Agent Based Modeling (ABM) has been 
used in CAS-based business research to describe pricing behaviors and corresponding 
consumer behaviors under a variety of complex conditions.  Of particular note is 
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economic research done in the field of pricing under piracy.  ABM based research on 
pricing in the face of piracy reveals that piracy reduces the effectiveness of skimming 
strategies and that the success of any skimming strategy is dependent on the firms’ 
abilities to affect the piracy risk cost faced by consumers (Khouja, Hadzikadic, 
Rajagopalan, & Tsay, 2008).  Given the complicated inter-dependencies of this model, an 
analysis of this type would be more difficult if analytical modeling was used. 
An advantage of CAS and ABM in particular over other research methodologies 
is their ability to model more complex relationships than would otherwise be possible.  
As agents act in accordance to their rules, their behavior, given the differences in their 
individual parameters and their interactions with other agents, taken in aggregate allows 
conclusions to be made about the system behavior.  For example, a particular group of 
agents may typically behave a particular way when confronted with a certain combination 
of environmental factors along with actions from one or more other group of agents.  This 
type of insight is not possible in most empirical research due to the exorbitant data 
collection requirements and the difficulty therein.  While we are able to track the 
behaviors of the individual agents or actors in the simulation, this aggregation is where 
the research effort gains a significant portion of its value: though its ability to predict 
individual behavior based on the behavior of a collection of behaviors given a certain set 
of conditions. 
As with any type of simulation, a key goal of the simulation study is to evaluate 
how the model moves towards steady-state equilibrium.  As the system moves towards 
this equilibrium, it is possible to study snapshots at individual points in time; however, it 
is typically of greater value to view the general trends that lead agents towards 
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equilibrium.  These trends may come from a variety of class or environmental factors and 
their complex interactions with the simpler rules that agents are programmed to follow.  
Agents need not be complex; indeed simpler rules are generally more effective when the 
system is viewed as a whole (Innes, 1999). 
4.1.2 Suitability of CAS & ABM 
Given the complex and interrelated nature of the multiplayer online game 
phenomena, it is wise to consider the use of simulation (Law, 2007) in studying this 
problem.  Further, given that the problem as presented is non-linear and involves several 
parties whose utility is dependent upon the actions of numerous other parties (i.e. via 
network externalities), CAS and specifically ABM are suitable means for further 
investigation.  Given that agents will behave in an autonomous manner and will be 
making decisions based on the rules of their class, we expect to be able to point to certain 
generalized rules or circumstances that hold for the different classes of agents.  CAS has 
been used to explain phenomena related to markets that contain certain unquantifiable 
externalities such as heroin dealing based on limited datasets (Hoffner, Bobashev, & 
Morris, 2009).  A particular convenience in the aforementioned research effort is that 
normal economic rules can be suspended or modified such as easing rational behavior 
rules given that the behavior in question involves a highly addictive substance.  This is 
particularly of interest given the network externalities that exist in multiplayer online 
games.  Since such systems are self-organizing and are focused at the micro-level rules as 
they constrain behavior within a dynamic environment, it is possible to see how 
decentralized group (or class) decisions evolve and are collectively made over time 
without any overt efforts to control the collective behavior by any one member of the 
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common class.  Again, given the network externalities inherent in our problem, this mass 
movement is of particular interest.  Also, not all relationships within the CAS are 
important which means that with time the important behaviors of the system will rise to 
the surface and the system will achieve some form of long-term repetitive pattern or will 
otherwise achieve some form of steady-state. 
The following sections present an agent based modeling simulation for testing 
several different pricing models.  This simulation was conducted to explore the impacts 
of network externalities on the pricing of online multiplayer video games.  Following 
sections present a discussion about the agents, their rules, the simulation procedures, and 
finally, the results and conclusions drawn from this study. 
4.2 Simulation Design 
This simulation was performed in the NetLogo simulation environment.  The user 
inputs a variety of parameters and several sets of agents follow their rules as outlined in 
the following sections.    There are two types of agents, consumers and the game 
publisher.  In this experiment, there are two pricing models (subscription and single 
purchase) both of which have four pricing strategies: fixed price (FP), revenue seeking 
(RS), low-high-low oscillation (O1), and high-low-high oscillation (O2).  The parameters 
used by the simulation are shown in Table 4.1.1.  The following sections detail a revenue 
dependent subscription pricing scheme with several additional schemes and 
modifications provided before a description of the simulation’s procedures.  
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Table 4.1.1 – Simulation parameters 
Simulation 
Name 
 
Description 
 
Notation Notes 
N Number of consumers in the simulation   3 
Active_Players Number of players playing the game in period      1 
#_Player_Links 
Number of connections between consumer   and 
other consumers 
    
Mean_Player_Links Mean value of       3 
Player_Link_StDev Standard deviation of       3 
Fellow_Gamers 
Number of neighbors of consumer   playing the 
game in period   
     1 
Joining_Probability Probability of consumer   joining game in period        1 
#_Game_Links 
Number of beginning links originating from the 
game publisher to a randomly selected consumers  
   3 
Network_Externalities Effects of network externalities   3 
Player_Budget Budget of consumer   discounted in period        1 
Income Undiscounted budget of consumer       
Mean_Budget Mean value of       3 
Budget_StDev Standard deviation of       3 
Price Price charged by game publisher during in period      1, 3 (for   ) 
Price_Change 
Price change (up or down) that the game publisher 
enacts  in period      from period    
    3 
Retention_Rate 
      is the probability that a player will quit 
playing the game during any given period   
  2, 3 
Discount Consumer discount rate   3 
IRR_Publisher Internal Rate of Return for publisher   3 
Duration Time horizon   3 
Periods_Discounted Number of periods that budget is discounted   2, 3 
Notes 
1) Varies with t 
2) Single Purchase only 
3) User specified 
 
 
 
4.2.1 Agents 
4.2.1.1 Consumers 
A few basic rules govern whether or not a consumer chooses to purchase the 
game.  First, if a consumer has a neighbor that is playing the game, the player has a 
nonzero probability of subscribing to the game.  This probability increases with the 
number of neighbors that are playing according to the function:  
 
      
    
  
 
 
 [4.1]  
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Where        is the effect of network externalities and where      is the number of 
neighbors of consumer   who are playing the game in period  .  This function results in a 
non-linear relationship between the neighbors who are fellow gamers and the probability 
of player   with    neighbors joining the game as shown in Figure 1.1.  With zero 
neighbors playing a game, there is no chance of a consumer choosing to subscribe to the 
game.  With a single neighbor playing out of a total of 10 neighbors, the probability 
increases to 32%, assuming the consumer’s budget is greater than or equal to the price, 
and with five neighbors playing the probability of joining the game increases to 
approximately 71%.  If all of the consumer’s neighbors are active in the game, the 
probability of joining increases to 100%.  If the total number of neighbors is less (i.e. two 
neighbors) then if one neighbor is playing there is now a 71% chance of the consumer 
choosing to buy a subscription and 100% chance if both neighbors are playing.  Another 
function which increases the variability of the purchasing decision (i.e.              ) 
is: 
        
 
    
  
  
 [4.2]  
Assuming the consumer is aware of the game (i.e.       ) then the player will 
evaluate the game’s price in terms of their budget.  If the game is within the consumer’s 
budget, the consumer will purchase the game.  The consumer’s budget      is a normally 
distributed random variable with a mean of    and a standard deviation of   .  Once 
generated, a player’s budget does not change from period to period.  A Player will leave a 
game if it is priced outside their budget but remain aware of the game as discussed in 
subsequent sections.  These players have the option of rejoining the game if the price of 
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the game falls to within their budget.  The mechanics of the process in which consumers 
decide whether or not to buy the game are explained greater detail in Section 4.2.2.2. 
Each consumer has a budget of    that is normally distributed according to the parameters 
above.  To enable comparisons between subscription and single purchase models, the 
budget per period of the single purchase strategies are discounted at the discount rate   
such that: 
 
    
  
   
 
  
 
 
 
   
 [4.3]  
 
 
Figure 4.1.1: Probability of a consumer joining a game               
 
 
4.2.1.2 Game Publisher 
Like consumers, the game publisher follows a few rules.  At the end of each 
period, the game publisher has the option of changing the price.  The simulation has a 
selection menu which allows the examination of different pricing strategies.  With this 
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feature, the user has the option of selecting the rules that the game publisher will follow 
from the following:  
Rule 1:  Revenue seeking (RS).  If revenue increased between the last period and 
the current period, the publisher will increase price by an amount 
specified by the user       or      .  If revenue decreased between the last 
period and the current period, the publisher will decrease price by the 
same amount.  In this policy, the simulation needs to identify the optimal 
initial price      or      and the optimal change amount,       or      . 
Rule 2:  Fixed price (FP).  The user can select a fixed price for the entire life of 
the game.  In this mode, the game publisher will not deviate from the user 
specified    or   regardless of the changes in revenue.  So for this policy, 
the simulation needs to identify the optimal price      or      to charge for 
the entire horizon. 
Rule 3:  Oscillation (O1 or O2).  The user can also choose to change the pricing 
model option which will force the game into oscillating price in a low, 
high, low, high… pattern.  The aforementioned     or     parameter 
represents the represents the difference between the high and low values 
of the oscillation pattern.  For this policy, the simulation needs to identify 
the optimal initial price      or      the optimal change amount       or 
      and the direction of the first change. 
Rule 4:  When the single purchase selection is activated, players purchase the 
game only once.  Once a player has purchased the game, they have the 
same awareness of the game even if they choose to quit playing for some 
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time as a direct link to the game is maintained.  They may choose to 
rejoin if enough neighbors are playing the game with their budget not 
being a consideration as the simulation is operating in single purchase 
mode and they already own the rights to play the game.  The single 
purchase model option enables the user to enter a value for retention rate 
  where     is the probability each period that a player who has 
purchased the game will stop playing until reactivated by the simulation 
loop described in latter sections. 
Rule 5:  In each mode, if the publisher has no revenue for 5 periods, the game will 
cease to exist (die) and is not replaced by the simulation. 
In the subscription model, during each period the game publisher earns revenue of 
         [4.4]  
Similarly, in the single purchase model, the game publisher earns revenue each period of 
 
        [4.5]  
To allow revenue comparisons between models, in both models, revenue is discounted to 
the present value in the initial period: 
 
 
 
    
  
   
 
  
 
  
[4.6]  
Where   is the publisher’s internal rate of return.  So that total revenue is 
       
 
   
 [4.7]  
93 
By computing net present value (NPV) in this manner, we are able to compare the results 
of the different pricing strategies for both single purchase and subscription models.  This 
is critical as without any discounting, the subscription model has a built-in advantage. 
4.2.1.3 Links 
Consumers who are not linked to the game publisher or any players of the game 
have no awareness of the game.  Players who choose to subscribe to a game have a direct 
link created between the game publisher and themselves.  This means that they maintain 
awareness of the game and treat the game publisher as a neighbor even if they stop 
playing the game due to a price change.  Awareness does not disappear over time as links 
(both initial and manufactured) are not removed from the environment.  The links 
between players are randomly generated.    The actual number of links between a 
consumer and other consumers can be either deterministic or an independent, identically 
distributed (iid) random variable with a mean of    and a standard deviation of   .  In the 
case of a deterministic   , while there is a maximum of      total links between 
players, it is possible that two links could be generated over the same path.  This means 
that the number of links can be lower than the maximum as a duplicated link counts as a 
single link instead of two links.  Also, links between players are undirected links, that is, 
a link going from    to      is no different from a link going from      to   .  This is an 
important distinction as it allows awareness to “move” in either direction as the 
simulation environment changes. 
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4.2.2 Simulation Mechanics 
As mentioned in earlier sections, this simulation was conducted using NetLogo.  
NetLogo is particularly well suited for this type of problem as it is both flexible, thus 
allowing us to vary a wide range of inputs, and robust.   
4.2.2.1 Layout 
Figure 4.1.2 shows the layout of the simulation environment.  In this example 
there are 80 consumers with two links to other consumers and a single game publisher 
with initial links to five players (the beta-test group).  In this environment, red triangles 
are consumers who are as yet potential customers.  The circle is the game publisher and 
the colored triangles are players who were in the beta-test group or have been influenced 
by pre-release market enthusiasm for the respective game. 
 
 
Figure 4.1.2: Simulation environment 
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4.2.2.2 Procedures 
This section outlines the procedures and processes of the revenue dependent 
subscription pricing model.  The oscillation and steady price models are simpler versions 
of the procedures outlined in this section.  The simulation is initialized according to the 
user specified parameters.  These parameters provide inputs for the initial period and 
provide the setup links.  Each period that follows uses the procedure outlined in Table 
4.1.2.  Graphical representation of the simulation process for the subscription model is 
shown in Figure 4.1.3.  This procedural loop will continue until the user terminates the 
session or stopping criteria is reached. 
 
Table 4.1.2 – Simulation procedures 
Step Action 
1 Consumers evaluate game in terms of neighbors and price 
2 Consumers link to game if purchased 
3 Game publisher evaluates revenue and sets price for next period 
4 GUI updates 
5 Simulation indexes 1 increment and returns to Step 1 
 
 
For a consumer there are two decision steps in evaluating the game in terms of 
neighbors and price.  The first step is two stage in the form of a conditional “AND” 
statement.  So long as       , the player knows the game exists.  Since the simulation 
loop has a 2 stage “IF” decision process for the player, either of them could trigger a 
failure to purchase.  The second IF is dependent on price and the consumer’s budget.  The 
second decision step considers the magnitude of     .  Put simply, assuming the player is 
aware of the game, or that at least one neighbor is either playing the game or is the game 
publisher, then the player will evaluate the game’s price in terms of their budget after the 
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awareness check and then check to see if they are actually interested in playing the game 
as determined by     .  In terms of logic, the players will carry out the following actions: 
1
st
 decision – 2 stage IF: 
1) If        (i.e.       ) 
2) If      ? 
 If either of these checks fail, the player will skip the second decision will not 
buy the game during period  . 
 
2
nd
 decision – Another IF: 
3) Generate a random number             
4) If          ? 
 If this fails, the player will not buy the game during period  .  
 
At this point, the game publisher has to evaluate the changes in revenue between   and 
    and make a decision concerning price.  The simulation updates the GUI, indexes 
the time increment by one and the simulation loop begins anew. 
97 
Setup:
Consumers
Players
Games
Links
Layout
t = 0
For all Consumers:
Count fellow gamers (Gt) 
User Input
Display:
Redraw Network
t = t + 1
If Gi,t > 0 & 
If Bi > Price
Player:
Purchase Game
Create new link to game
Yes
Game Publisher
Evaluate Revenue
No
Is Rt ≥ Rt-1
Yes
Game Publisher:
Raise Price
Game Publisher:
Decrease Price
No
If pi,t > qi,tNo
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Figure 4.1.3: Simulation flowchart 
 
 
4.2.2.3 Simulation Setup and Initialization 
As described earlier, there are several pricing models that the simulation allows 
the user to select from.  The range of user specified values does not change between 
models, however, certain pricing schemes use different additional or fewer parameters 
depending on the pricing scheme, see Table 4.1.3.  Of the different parameters, it is 
important to note that in the initialization process, the user specifies the size of the initial 
group (i.e. the size of the beta-test group).  This group is connected to a web of 
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consumers which drives the growth of the game through these connections to additional 
consumers allowing us to model network externalities and their impacts on subscription 
sales. 
 
Table 4.1.3 – Simulation parameter values for subscription pricing model 
User Specified Parameter Symbol         Value Range 
N   Between 10 and 1000 
Mean_Player_Links    Between 1 and 10 
Player_Link_StDev    Between 0 and 5 
Network_Externalities   Between 0.1 and 1.0 
#_Game_Links    Between 1 and 30 
Mean_Budget    Between 1 and 100 
Budget_StDev    Between 0 and 20 
Price   ,    Between 1 and ∞ 
Price_Change    ,     Between 0 and ∞ 
Retention_Rate   Between 0.1 and 1.0 
Discount   Between 0.01 and 1.0 
IRR_Publisher   Between 0.01 and 1.0 
Duration   Between   and ∞ 
Periods_Discounted   Between 6 and ∞ 
 
 
4.3 Simulation Experiment 
4.3.1 Subscription Pilot Experiment 
This pilot experiment features a fixed price subscription based simulation.  The 
purpose of this experiment is to find the optimal price for the game publisher to charge 
for the game in a fixed price subscription model.  The parameter values used in the 
simulation for this experiment are shown in Table 4.2.1.  As described in earlier sections, 
the links between consumers were randomly generated as were the consumers’ budgets.   
Repeated runs of the simulation were conducted with a search for the best price    
using the bisection method, see Table 4.2.2 and Figure 4.2.1.     is the mean total revenue 
for each price tested earned by the publisher over the five runs whereas   is the mean 
number of subscriptions.  In each run, the simulation operated for 36 cycles        
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with no user specified changes permitted other than varying price.  As a fixed price 
strategy, price was not changed during any run.  While the simulation was always run for 
five iterations with each price, an abbreviated example with two sample simulation runs 
with the optimal prices for this pricing strategy is shown in Table 4.2.3 along with the 
different variables monitored during the simulation.  Given the parameters specified, the 
optimal subscription fee for this model exists between $7 and $8.  Figures 4.2.2 – 4.2.4 
show for the optimal price       the sales per period, how total revenue changes per 
period, and the number of players linked to the game publisher per period respectively.  
The number of sales per period peaks around period 10 and then oscillates up and down 
due to the constantly changing values of     . 
Table 4.2.1 – Pilot experiment 
Simulation Name Notation Value 
N   1000 
Mean_Player_Links    5 
Player_Link_StDev    0 
#_Game_Links    10 
Mean_Budget    10 
Budget_StDev    2 
Price    10 
Price_Change     0 
Network_Externalities   0.5 
Retention_Rate   1.0 
Discount   0.4 
IRR_Publisher   0.3 
 
 
Table 4.2.2 – Bisection method 
   Mean Total Revenue     Mean Quantity Sold     
13 $ 572. 65 
5 $ 101,665. 31,888 
9 $ 92,134. 16,204 
7 $ 127,571. 28,585 
8 $ 119,313. 23,665 
6 $ 117,482. 30,943 
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Figure 4.2.1: Bisection method – subscription  
 
 
Table 4.2.3 – Variables monitored and results 
Simulation Name Description Notation 
Results 
Run 1 
Results 
Run 2 
Price/Fee Optimal Fee   
  $ 7 
Total_Active_Players 
Number of players playing the game 
during period   
   See Figure 2.2 
Total_Revenue Revenue earned over     $ 127,721 $ 128,361 
Revenue Revenue earned during period      See Figure 2.3 
Total_Sales Total number of sales over     28,552 28,621 
Sales Sales in period      See Figure 2.2 
Losses 
Number of players in period   priced out 
due to     or via       
 N/A 
Rejoins 
Number of players in period   who 
rejoin game after leaving 
 N/A 
Links 
Number of links generated in period   
by buyers not in the beta group 
 See Figure 2.4 
Flat_Revenue Number of periods where       0 0 
Max_Sales    of most profitable period over    897 894 
Max_Period Most profitable period    12 21 
Min_Sales 
   of least profitable period over   
where      
 31 34 
Min_Period Least profitable period    0 0 
Change Largest change in    over    210 200 
Change_Period Largest changing period    3 4 
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Figure 4.2.2: Subscriptions 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2.3: Total revenue 
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Figure 4.2.4: Number of player links to game publisher 
 
 
 
4.3.2 Single Purchase Pilot Experiment 
 
 
This pilot experiment features a fixed price single purchase based simulation.  
The parameter values were not changed from those shown in Table 4.2.1.  Repeated runs 
of the simulation were conducted with a search for the best price    using the bisection 
method, see Table 4.2.4 and Figure 4.2.5.   
A notable difference between the single purchase and the subscription models is 
the discounting of the players’ budget.  In the subscription model, consumers have a 
budget of 
       [4.8]  
Whereas in the single purchase model the consumer looks at their current budget amount 
of    as well as the present value of the next several periods.  By discounting the budget 
per period, we make the models comparable.  Thus, the consumer uses a budget of 
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 [4.9]  
   is the mean total revenue for each price tested earned by the publisher over the five 
runs whereas    is the mean number of game sales in each period.  In each run, the 
simulation terminated early (before     ) per to the revenue rule of the publisher as all 
possible sales had already happened.  Two example simulation runs with the optimal 
prices for this pricing strategy is shown in Table 4.2.5 along with the different status 
variables monitored during the simulation.  Given the parameters specified, the optimal 
price for this model exists between $162 and $163.  Figures 4.2.6 – 4.2.8 show for the 
optimal price         the sales per period, how total revenue changes per period, and 
the number of players linked to the game publisher per period respectively.   
Table 4.2.4 – Bisection method 
   Mean Total Revenue     Mean Quantity Sold      
250 $    37,198 179 
100 $    46,122 990 
175 $  130,496 805 
138 $  122,798 955 
156 $  130,233 898 
166 $  133,031 865 
161 $  133,010 888 
163 $  133,552 881 
162 $  133,539 888 
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Figure 4.2.5: Bisection method 
 
 
Table 4.2.5 – Variables monitored and results 
Simulation Name Description Notation 
Results 
Run 1 
Results 
Run 2 
Price Optimal Price   
  $ 163 
Total_Active_Players 
Number of players playing the game 
during period   
   See Figure 2.8 
Total_Revenue Revenue earned over     $ 134,336 $ 133,052 
Revenue Revenue earned during period      See Figure 2.7 
Total_Sales Total number of sales over     883 887 
Sales Sales in period      See Figure 2.6 
Losses 
Number of players in period   priced out 
due to     or via       
 0 0 
Rejoins 
Number of players in period   who rejoin 
game after leaving 
 0 0 
Links 
Number of links generated in period   by 
buyers not in the beta group 
 See Figure 2.8 
Flat_Revenue Number of periods where       0 0 
Max_Sales    of most profitable period over    287 287 
Max_Period Most profitable period    3 3 
Min_Sales 
   of least profitable period over   where 
     
 2 8 
Min_Period Least profitable period    7 6 
Change Largest change in    over    115 123 
Change_Period Largest changing period    2 2 
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Figure 4.2.6: Sales 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2.7: Total revenue 
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Figure 4.2.8: Number of player links to game publisher 
 
 
 
4.3.3 Implementation 
A NetLogo program was created to run multiple passes through each combination 
of variables.  By using several “while” loops, the program identifies the optimal price for 
each combination (pricing strategy,  ,   , retention rate, discount horizon, and   ) using 
the search  method described in  Section 4.3.3.2 and 4.3.3.3.  Upon completion of this 
step, the program runs a simulation trial with the currently selected group of 
aforementioned parameters, see Section 4.3.3.4.  Figure 4.2.9 shows the loops in which 
the simulation program moves through.  The shaded processes each call the procedure 
shown in Figure 4.1.3. 
0 
100 
200 
300 
400 
500 
600 
700 
800 
900 
1000 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Run 1 
Run 2 
107 
 
User Input
Initialize 
Simulation 
Environment
Load Parameter 
Values
Find Upper Limit 
for Optimal P0 
Search
Find Lower Limit 
for Optimal P0 
Search
Find Midpoint for 
Optimal P0 Search
Store Max 
Revenues and 
Max P0 as New 
Upper and Lower 
Limits
If Upper Limit Minus 
Lower Limit < 1
No
Output Best Price 
and Revenue 
Values
Yes
Clear Environment 
and Index to Next 
Set of Parameter 
Values
 
Figure 4.2.9: Simulation experiment 
 
 
 
4.3.3.1 Initialization and Program Startup 
The values for the simulation’s parameters are shown in Table 4.3.1.  All 1,296 
solutions were identified.   
Table 4.3.1 – Parameter values 
Simulation Name Symbol Value Notes 
N         
Mean_Player_Links           1 
Player_Link_StDev       
#_Game_Links          1 
Mean_Budget            
Budget_StDev            
Price_Change    ,                2 
Network_Externalities               1 
Retention_Rate               1 
Discount        3 
IRR_Publisher        3 
Duration      4 
Periods_Discounted            1 
Notes 
1) Systematically varied by experiment 
2) Bi is used for single purchase strategies.  For subscription the mean of bi is used 
3) Nominal APR discounted monthly 
4) Simulation may end early due to revenue rule of game publisher 
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Since increasing the discount horizon has the same effect as decreasing the 
consumers’ discount rate for single purchase strategies we only vary the discount horizon 
   , which means that the consumers’ discounted budget is: 
 
    
  
   
 
  
 
 
   
   
 [4.10]  
Since the program starts at    , the discounting of a consumer’s budget goes from   to 
   . 
The program was initialized with the lower values for each of the parameters used 
(i.e. if                 then the program will begin at      ).  This means that there 
are 1,296 total combinations or 162 for each of the different pricing strategies all of 
which are indexed through via multiple nested “while” loops.  We hold the distribution of 
consumers’ budgets as a constant as well as  , duration, customer discount rate, and IRR 
of the publisher.  When applicable, the amount of the price change between periods was 
set at           .  In generating the consumer agents’ budgets, the distribution is 
truncated such that all values for    are greater than or equal to zero.  This safety measure 
exists because there is a possibility for some distributions generating negative consumer 
budgets.  For the distribution used in this experiment, this failsafe was not tripped and the 
program did not need to adjust any budgets. 
4.3.3.2 Optimal Price Search 
For each set of parameters the program will try to find the optimal price via the 
bisection method described in Section 3.2.  The program selects high and low points for 
the bisection method two times the calculated mean of players’ budgets and at 0.001 of 
the calculated mean of players’ budgets respectively.   
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In single purchase strategies, the calculated mean of players’ discounted budgets 
is used.  For program execution speed, this calculated mean is determined only once per 
simulation method run and is then stored in a self-clearing manner.  The simulation 
method is then run for five iterations for each of these and the mean total revenue is 
recorded for each.  The midpoint price between these two price points is selected and the 
simulation method is run again for five iterations with the mean total revenue for these 
five iterations being recorded.  The two price points that give the greatest mean total 
revenue are selected as endpoints and a new midpoint is calculated.  This process repeats 
until the two endpoints are less than $1.00 apart.  The simulation stores this optimal price 
as the optimal value for    for the current set of parameters.   
Due to the random number generator and also due to the failsafe described in 
Section 3.3.1, there exists the possibility that the calculated mean of players’ budgets is 
not perfectly equal to the proscribed mean, necessitating another failsafe.  In the event 
that the initial search space was inadequate (i.e.    is determined to be too close to the 
upper initial endpoint), the program can correct this.  If the difference between the upper 
initial endpoint and the optimal    is less than 1, the program will double the search area.  
By using the calculated mean of players’ budgets       or       instead of the mean of the 
underlying distribution     , the search process is quicker by one or two steps in the 
bisection method when the actual mean is slightly less than the proscribed mean.  If the 
proscribed mean is slightly less than the actual mean, this means that the search area is 
wider and there is less risk of the optimal    falling near an initial endpoint.  For the 
distribution used in this experiment, these phenomena did not occur and the program did 
not need to widen its search area.   
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4.3.3.3 Simulation Procedure 
The simulation procedure is a version of the pilot experiment designed for speed.  
It is initialized according to the user specified parameters for player budget, discount 
rates, etc.  This method runs for five iterations for each price examined during the 
bisection method described in Section 4.3.3.2 and is reinitialized each time.  In other 
words, before any iteration of the five starts, all agents are cleared and the setup method 
is run anew to repopulate the network.  After five iterations the simulation procedure 
returns the mean of total revenue for these five iterations as well as the maximum and 
minimum total revenues earned in addition to the mean total sales (or subscriptions).   
4.3.3.4 Simulation Trial 
Using the optimal price found according to Section 4.3.3.2 and with the values 
selected according to it the program’s progress through the loops described in Section 
4.3.3.1, the simulation procedure was run five times with the optimal value for    and 
(where appropriate) and a price change as outlined earlier.  This acts as a loading method 
for data reporting that enables the program to run faster and fit within the memory 
constraints of NetLogo.  At the conclusion of the trial, a data file is opened and outputs 
for the different parameters’ values, the revenue information calculated as above, as well 
as pricing information (   and the price change) are written.  At this point, the program 
closes the file, exits the write method, and moves back up to the next combination in the 
while loop.  This process continues for all 1,296 combinations. 
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4.4 Simulation Results 
4.4.1 Subscription Model Results 
There are four pricing strategies available for use in the subscription model.  
These are Fixed Price (FP), Revenue Seeking (RS), Oscillation Low, High, Low… (O1), 
and Oscillation High, Low, High… (O2).  Different strategies may work better for the 
different parameter combinations as outlined in earlier sections (see Figures 4.3.1 – 
4.3.3).  Table 4.3.2 shows the percentage of problems for which each strategy was best.  
The simulation program confirms the findings of Chapter 2.  An O1 strategy was best 78 
% of the time.  For two of the parameters studied (   and   ) we observe that these 
parameters have little impact within the strategy, that is, the revenue earned by each 
strategy is consistent regardless of the level of    and   .  This is not the case across 
strategies as each different strategy performs at a different level which remains consistent 
according to the point raised above.  A significant difference exists for   in that the 
effects of network externalities do measurably impact the revenues earned via each 
strategy, particularly at      .  This means that strength of network externality 
conditions determine the specific strategy that is optimal for the game publisher.  In 
considering the performance of the different strategies, we note the following: 
1) In most circumstances, a game publisher who is following a subscription 
based pricing model will find an O1 strategy to be one that provides superior 
results.   
2) The poor performance of RS strategy is due to the effects of how the game 
publisher increases price to a point beyond the customers’ budgets and then 
oscillates back and forth just above and below said budget.  This is different 
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from the O1 or O2 oscillation as the RS strategy increases to a suboptimal 
price and then oscillates around that price. 
3) The RS strategy was the most inconsistent of the four subscription based 
pricing strategies.  This high degree of variability in outcomes results in this 
strategy behaving in unexpected ways such as shown in Figure 3.2 where 
revenue would be expected to be increasing in   .  We make the same 
observation about the O2 strategy and note that we expected revenue to 
increase alongside increases in   . 
4) The marked differences between the revenues earned by a publisher following 
an O1 vs. an O2 strategy stem from the importance of network externalities 
and the fact that an O2 strategy immediately attempts to raise price instead of 
increasing market size. 
5) In examining the variability of the revenues earned by the different strategies 
(see Table 3.3 for an example) we find that a publisher following either a FP 
or O1 strategy will earn the most consistent stream of revenues. 
6) A FP strategy provides revenues close to that of the O1 strategy in many 
cases.  This strategy allows a publisher to earn considerable revenue without 
the price changes so unpopular with consumers. 
7) Beta test group size is important as all strategies earn more revenue with a 
larger test group size. 
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Figure 4.3.1: Revenue for network externalities of subscription pricing strategies 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3.2: Revenue for number of player links of subscription pricing strategies 
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Figure 4.3.3: Revenue for beta test group size of subscription pricing strategies 
 
 
Table 4.3.2 – Optimal subscription strategy distribution 
Subscription 
Strategy 
 
Overall 
 
0.2 
  
0.5 
 
0.8 
 
4 
   
7 
 
10 
   
10              30 
FP 22% 0% 0% 67% 17% 17% 33% 22% 22% 
RS 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
O1 78% 100% 100% 33% 83% 83% 67% 78% 78% 
O2 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
 
Table 4.3.3 – Variability in optimal solutions for different values of   in five runs  
      Mean Revenue Max – Min Min Max 
FP $  62,590.84 $    2,250.43 $  61,502.02 $  63,752.46 
RS $  59,050.59 $    9,491.43 $  53,985.87 $  63,477.30 
O1 $  69,502.39 $    1,237.89 $  68,892.97 $  70,130.86 
O2 $  67,119.70 $    3,343.65 $  65,396.18 $  68,739.84 
      
    
FP $  59,802.33 $    1,253.15 $  59,164.18 $  60,417.33 
RS $  40,832.42 $  10,424.98 $  35,324.03 $  45,749.01 
O1 $  63,883.26 $    1,750.43 $  62,997.35 $  64,747.79 
O2 $  52,483.02 $    4,178.94 $  50,424.08 $  54,603.01 
      
    
FP $    48,854.10 $    2,847.64 $    47,397.78 $    50,245.42 
RS $    13,518.64 $    8,067.18 $      9,497.03 $    17,564.21 
O1 $    48,870.98 $    3,377.25 $    47,207.46 $    50,584.71 
O2 $    25,931.96 $    4,675.39 $    23,588.25 $    28,263.64 
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4.4.2 Single Purchase Model Results 
The single purchase model has the same four pricing strategies available.  As with 
the subscription model, different strategies may be more suitable for different parameter 
combinations (see Figures 4.3.4 – 4.3.8).  Table 4.3.4 again shows the percentage of 
times for which each strategy was best.  Unlike in the subscription model, in the single 
purchase model all parameters affect revenue.  In examining revenue changes for the 
different strategies as a result of changing parameters, we note the following: 
1) In most circumstances, a game publisher who is following a single purchase 
pricing model will find an RS to be one that provides superior results. 
2) The performance of the RS strategy is due to the effects of how the game 
publisher increases price to a point beyond the customers’ budgets a single 
time before attempting to skim the rest of the market (i.e. RS is a skimming 
strategy) 
3) When retention rate is low, a publisher should not follow the RS strategy.  
However, the RS strategy provides significantly higher revenues than the 
other strategies at high retention rate levels, the same of which occurs when 
considering strength of network externalities.  Unlike the other strategies 
which stay in the same price area throughout the game, the RS strategy can go 
much higher in price.  This means that when retention rate is low and network 
effects are negligible, a consumer may have several chances to buy the game 
at a price they can afford in these three strategies, but only one or two chances 
to buy the game at a price they can afford when a publisher is following the 
RS strategy. 
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4) The RS and O2 strategies were the most inconsistent (highest variability) of 
the four single purchase strategies, whereas a publisher following either a FP 
or O1 strategy will earn the most consistent stream of revenues. 
5) An O1 strategy has a revenue curve that is decreasing in    (see Figure 4.3.8).  
This drop is due to the nature of the beta test group and how the members 
already have a copy of the game in their possession.  While an increased beta 
group size does allow the game to spread through the network faster thereby 
increasing total revenue by not losing it to discounting effects, it is also true 
with a slower initial spread of the game, the publisher has a better chance to 
capitalize on network externalities by charging a higher price.  A large beta 
group causes purchases to occur too early. 
6) The consumer discount horizon     has a strong effect on the revenue earned 
via each strategy. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3.4: Revenue for network externalities of single purchase pricing strategies 
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Figure 4.3.5: Revenue for number of player links of single purchase pricing strategies 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3.6: Revenue for periods discounted of single purchase pricing strategies 
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Figure 4.3.7: Revenue for retention rate of single purchase pricing strategies 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3.8: Revenue for beta test group size of single purchase pricing strategies 
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Table 4.3.4 – Optimal subscription strategy distribution 
Single Purchase 
Strategy 
 
Overall 
 
0.2 
  
0.5 
 
0.8 
 
4 
   
7 
 
10 
   
10         30  
FP 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
 
RS 81% 100% 94% 50% 74% 81% 89% 81% 81% 
 
O1 10% 0% 0% 30% 15% 9% 6% 10% 10% 
 
O2 9% 0% 6% 20% 11% 9% 6% 9% 9% 
 
  
 
0.4 
  
0.6 
 
0.8 
 
12 
  
24 
 
36    
FP 
 
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
   
RS 
 
100% 94% 50% 81% 81% 81% 
   
O1 
 
0% 0% 30% 7% 15% 7% 
   
O2 
 
0% 6% 20% 11% 4% 11% 
   
 
 
4.4.3 Comparisons Between Single Purchase & Subscription Models 
The subscription and single purchase models provide comparable results; 
however, there are certain circumstances when one is preferable to the other (see Table 
4.3.5).  The optimal prices for each strategy as found by the bisection method in the 
experiment are shown in Table 4.3.6 as well as the percentage of the market captured by 
each strategy. 
1) Within each model, not all strategies are viable.  In particular, the single purchase 
FP strategy and the subscription RS and O2 strategies are never optimal.   
2) A game publisher who is uncertain about the consumer population preferences 
and the characteristics of the game would be advised to choose a single purchase 
RS strategy or a subscription O1 strategy as these are the best strategies 36 % and 
48 % of the time respectively. 
3) Revenue earned for each strategy in the single purchase model is dependent on 
the value of the different parameters to a greater degree than was the case for the 
strategies of the subscription model.   
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4) No strategy completely clears the market.  That said, the single purchase RS 
strategy clears 91 % of the market and four other strategies clear 80 % of the 
market or more. 
5) The performance differences of the RS strategy is due to the effects of how the 
game publisher increases price to a point beyond the customers’ budgets once in 
the single purchase strategy before attempting to skim the rest of the market 
instead of oscillating above and below this upper budget limit as was the case in 
the subscription model. 
6) In both the single purchase and the subscription model, the RS and O2 strategies 
were the most inconsistent (highest variability) of the four strategies. 
7) Each parameter studied affects the optimal initial price charged by the publisher, 
regardless of the strategy used. 
8) While both the subscription and the single purchase models have less revenue 
potential when   is high, the single purchase model provides superior results as 
network externalities only influence one purchase decision for each player instead 
of repeated purchase decisions for each player as is the case for the subscription 
model. 
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Table 4.3.5 – Optimal strategy distribution 
 
Strategy 
 
Overall 
 
0.2 
  
0.5 
 
0.8 
 
4 
   
7 
 
10 
   
10          30 
 
FP (Sub) 6% 0% 0% 19% 2% 7% 9% 4% 0%  
FP (SP) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
RS (Sub) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
RS (SP) 36% 33% 41% 35% 30% 39% 41% 28% 81%  
O1 (Sub) 48% 67% 56% 22% 56% 44% 44% 59% 0%  
O1 (SP) 5% 0% 0% 15% 7% 6% 2% 7% 7%  
O2 (Sub) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
O2 (SP) 4% 0% 4% 9% 6% 4% 4% 2% 11%  
   
0.4 
  
0.6 
 
0.8 
 
12 
  
24 
 
36 
   
FP (Sub)  7% 9% 15% 15% 4% 0%    
FP (SP)  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%    
RS (Sub)  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%    
RS (SP)  39% 41% 0% 0% 28% 81%    
O1 (Sub)  44% 44% 85% 85% 59% 0%    
O1 (SP)  6% 2% 0% 0% 7% 7%    
O2 (Sub)  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%    
O2 (SP)  4% 4% 0% 0% 2% 11%    
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Table 4.3.6 – Optimal prices and fees 
 
Strategy 
Mean 
   or    
% of 
Market 
 
0.2 
  
0.5 
 
0.8 
 
4 
   
7 
 
10 
FP (Sub) $    2.50 79 % $    2.97 $    2.28 $    2.25 $    2.47 $    2.48 $    2.56 
FP (SP) $  61.38 86 % $  62.20 $  61.54 $  60.39 $  61.13 $  61.67 $  61.34 
RS (Sub) $    1.46 39 % $    1.64 $    1.95 $    0.78 $    1.36 $    1.42 $    1.59 
RS (SP) $  64.81 91 % $  79.84 $  63.09 $  51.50 $  59.97 $  65.68 $  68.78 
O1 (Sub) $    2.25 80 % $    2.26 $    2.25 $    2.25 $    2.25 $    2.25 $    2.25 
O1 (SP) $  58.83 89 % $  59.42 $  59.32 $  57.76 $  58.78 $  58.86 $  58.86 
O2 (Sub) $    3.75 47 % $    3.75 $    3.75 $    3.76 $    3.75 $    3.75 $    3.75 
O2 (SP) $  71.68 88 % $  72.69 $  72.48 $  69.88 $  71.68 $  71.83 $  71.54 
 
   
10          30 
 
0.4 
  
0.6 
 
0.8 
 
12 
  
24 
 
36 
FP (Sub) $    2.38 $    2.63  $    2.50   $    2.45   $    2.56   $    2.50   $    2.48   $    2.53  
FP (SP) $  60.63 $  62.13  $  60.83   $  61.69   $  61.62   $  36.03   $  62.90   $  85.21  
RS (Sub) $    1.33 $    1.59  $    1.48   $    1.45   $    1.45   $    1.45   $    1.45   $    1.48  
RS (SP) $  58.22 $  71.40  $  65.02   $  61.65   $  67.75   $  38.06   $  66.58   $  89.79  
O1 (Sub) $    2.25 $    2.25  $    2.26   $    2.25   $    2.25   $    2.25   $    2.25   $    2.25  
O1 (SP) $  58.69 $  58.97  $  58.02   $  59.14   $  59.34   $  34.52   $  60.35   $  81.63  
O2 (Sub) $    3.76 $    3.75  $    3.75   $    3.75   $    3.75   $    3.76   $    3.75   $    3.75  
O2 (SP) $  71.75 $  71.62  $  70.37   $  71.98   $  72.70   $  42.03   $  73.54   $  99.48  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
 
The preceding chapters provided the reader with an overview of online 
multiplayer games, presented two mathematical models for pricing online games, tested 
those models’ sensitivity via a numerical experiment, and finally conducted a simulation 
experiment to find the best price for online multiplayer games.  The following sections of 
this final chapter examine the different limitations in the approaches taken during this 
research, provide a roadmap for future research efforts, and end with a few concluding 
remarks. 
5.1 Limitations 
In Chapter 2 there is a limitation in the structure of the model.  In the model we 
hold that utility in the current time period is a function of the number of players in the 
previous time period.  To be more realistic, the utility in the current time period is 
actually a function of the number of players in the current time period as these are who a 
player is engaged with at that particular time.  Also, the utility in the first time period is a 
function of both the beta test group, the number of players in the current time period, 
among several other factors.  In the models presented, we used the beta test group and 
     in the utility function because if utility is a function of   , then we are faced with an 
intractable problem (i.e. utility is a function of the number of players in the game and the 
number of players in the game is a function of utility).  We assume that the position that 
the beta test group size is a reasonable proxy for the number of players in the first period.  
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Also, in subsequent periods the number of players in the preceding period is an 
acceptable proxy for the number of players in the current period.  While we do not 
consider this limitation to be one which impacts the usefulness of the model, for the sake 
of completeness it must be noted. 
Also in Chapter 2, we should note that in the model we hold customer growth 
expectation of the game’s growth factor     static.    is the consumers’ expectation and 
the publisher may know that initial expectations held by the consumers are erroneous.  
For the purpose of this dissertation,   is fixed; however, in reality   is most likely 
dynamic as customer expectations are expected to change with regards to the game.  
There are possibilities of investigating when customers update their expectations based 
on past sales.  Further, publishers may have information where they know expectations 
held by the consumers are overly optimistic or pessimistic; however, we do not 
investigate those situations in this dissertation. 
There is one point about Chapter 3 that need to be made.  For each parameter 
tested, we used low, medium, and high values.  Even with only these three values for 
each parameter, we were faced with more than 6,000 parameter combinations, each of 
which required some time to calculate the best prices.  While additional values for each 
parameter would be preferred, more than three values for each were not used due to the 
amount of processing time required. 
There are a few limitations in Chapter 4 that merit discussion.  The numbers 
provided in the results section are dependent upon the budget distribution.  These results 
are applicable on for this budget.  While a reader may look at the budget numbers and 
consider them to be inappropriate, we caution that these are for a set of consumers who 
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are considering a single game.  In point of fact, most game playing consumers actually 
play several games during any given period, switching between their gaming library 
according to their own tastes and preferences.  This means that if a consumer has a 
budget of $20 per period then only a certain percentage of this budget is spent on the 
game in question and we have a capital allocation problem.  Additionally, with only a 
single game in the simulation environment, the game publisher is a monopolist instead of 
in an environment where there is competition with many providers each having 
monopolistic tendencies. 
Additionally concerning Chapter 4, the simulation experiment called the 
simulation procedure approximately 75,000 times in total taking a considerable amount 
of time to run.  This forced us to limit the size of the population to 1,000 which ultimately 
resulted in the network being denser than we would typically see in industry.  As 
presented, players were (depending upon the value of   ) connected to up to ten other 
players or 0.1 % of the gaming population. While this does not seem unreasonable at 
first, when scaled up to a game with a population of several million, it does become an 
improbable number of connections between players.  This means that awareness of the 
game spreads throughout the simulation much faster than may be the case in industry.  
Reducing    to lower levels was not possible as it resulted in wild swings in revenue due 
to the increased amount of variability in the simulation model during pilot testing.  
Attempts to increase the total number of players beyond 1,000 were not possible due to 
the volume of calculations each period and hardware limitations.  Ideally, there would be 
a total number of consumers of several million, all linked to a random number of other 
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players.  With this exception of   , all of the other parameters have reasonable values 
given the size of the consumer base. 
5.2 Future Work 
In future efforts we intend to expand upon the framework laid out in the preceding 
chapters.  In the mathematical model and numerical experiment we intend to make 
allowances for additional parameters in the utility function such as game genre and type 
of play as well as    and   .  These are critical additions as different types of game 
become more or less popular with time.  Following the release of the Lord of the Rings 
Trilogy, game publishers saw an increase in the popularity of high fantasy type games 
such as World of Warcraft.  As of this writing, AMC’s The Walking Dead was one of the 
more popular TV series and zombie themed movies were rising in popularity.  Not 
coincidentally, the writers note a considerable surge of zombie or apocalypse themed 
games in popularity as well as the possible start of a decline in the high fantasy genre. 
In the simulation experiment, we can introduce multiple games into the 
environment and examine the capital allocation problem that consumers face when they 
have a wider array of purchasing options.  By varying the timing at which games are 
introduced into the market, we will be able to also look at the first mover advantage 
problem that game publishers face and to see what strategies game publishers can use to 
move into a market that is already saturated with offerings from rivals.  This is an 
important area of future work as there are tens of thousands of games on the market as of 
this writing with more being introduced or announced every day. 
Platform considerations are also an area that merits consideration.  As of this 
writing both the Play Station 4 by Sony and the newest version of Microsoft’s Xbox were 
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slated for release within a year’s time.  Hardware improvements in these platforms and 
PCs as well as improvements in bandwidth and software capabilities mean that customers 
are able to enjoy a more immersive gaming experience than was possible in years past.  
With any cutting edge technology, there is a certain amount of hype and excitement that 
permeates the market.  Considering where different platforms are in their development 
cycle is important when attempting to build a consumer utility function. 
Additionally, we intend to consider the controversial issue of digital rights 
management (DRM).   Game publishers have long had issues with software piracy and 
finding and testing pricing solutions that mitigate the effects of piracy or reduce the 
inclination to engage in piracy are of importance if game publishers are to continue to 
operate. 
Finally, of the different revenue schemes introduced in Chapter 1, at this point we 
have only managed to examine two of them in detail.  Future work must be done in 
examining these different pricing strategies, particularly the microtransaction model with 
limited vs. fully free play.  This particular strategy has proven effective in industry; 
however, to date there has been no research effort to identify the optimal amount of 
limitation or the optimal price charged for the removal of this limitation. 
5.3 Conclusion 
This research effort provides a rigorous examination of the pricing of online 
games and how network externalities impact the pricing of multiplayer games.  In 
considering this problem, this effort has included a wide range of parameters known to be 
of import to the player base of online games.  While considering as many parameters in 
this study as was done did result in a few limitations, the implications for management 
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and future research are considerable.  The rest of this section provides a brief review of 
what was done in previous chapters and concludes with a few words about online games 
and gaming. 
The first chapter provides an overview of online games and gaming.  This review 
goes through the different classification of games that exist and makes distinctions about 
what makes these classifications important.  In discussing the pricing of online games, it 
makes note of the industry structure and how games are digital experience goods whose 
price is a function of the number of people who are willing to buy the game, the amount 
invested in developing the game, and the level of service provided to the consumer.  
Chapter 1 concludes with a discussion of how games are currently creating or maintain 
revenue streams and how these streams of revenue work. 
Chapter 2 takes two of these revenue models, single purchase and subscription, 
and presents two mathematical formulations and their mathematical properties.  Both of 
these models are three period models and have a growth, maturity, and decline phase and 
revenues which results from the best prices reflect these phases.  For each model, a 
numerical example is provided which illustrates the pricing changes that occur in each. 
Building upon the framework in Chapter 2 and the concepts introduced in the 
literature review, Chapter 3 contains a numerical experiment which tests the sensitivity of 
the different parameters in the two models.  In this experiment we varied   ,   ,   ,  , 
 ,  ,  , and   with low, medium, and high values.  This was done for the single purchase 
model with different levels of customer growth expectation and compared (where 
possible) to the subscription model.  In stretching the time horizon from three to five 
periods, we were able to confirm the pricing patterns found in Chapter 2 in that a best 
129 
strategy is to hold the price low, raise the price to capitalize on network externalities and 
their effects on the previous period’s sales, and then lower the price again.  The chapter 
concludes with a series of implications about game pricing and recommendations for 
management.  We point to three important conclusions from this chapter.  Cash starved 
publishers should follow a single purchase pricing strategy as it provides more revenue in 
the early periods.  Second, if customers believe that growth will be low but the publisher 
believes that customers are wrong and that growth will be high, then the company should 
follow a subscription pricing strategy.  Finally, when a publisher is using a subscription 
strategy, they should oscillate the price of subscriptions periodically to increase utility 
based on network externalities and then price to capitalize on this increased utility. 
Chapter 4 takes the implications about pricing from the previous chapter and 
builds an agent based modeling simulation in order to examine the different pricing 
models in greater detail.  Four different pricing strategies (fixed price, revenue seeking, 
and two types of oscillation) are tested for each pricing model.  By varying a wide range 
of parameters and tracking the performance of the game over time, we were able to 
conclude the chapter with several additional implications and recommendations for 
management.  In particular, we note that a game publisher who is uncertain about the 
consumer population’s preferences should use either a revenue seeking single purchase 
strategy or an oscillating subscription strategy. 
To conclude, video games, specifically online multiplayer games, offer 
considerable revenue and research potential.  Games are unique in that they have proven 
to be resilient in the face of adverse economic conditions providing a needed escape, 
however temporary, for their players.  It is the expressed wish of the authors that both 
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researchers and practitioners in industry find this research to be both informative and 
useful in their future endeavors. 
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